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test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests
Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide
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dadachann
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"""Test cross-tenant isolation boundaries."""
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import pytest
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import uuid
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_tenant_a_cannot_access_tenant_b_bots(auth_client_factory):
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"""Tenant A cannot see or modify Tenant B's bots."""
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# Create two workspaces with different users
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client_a = await auth_client_factory(email="tenant_a@test.com")
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client_b = await auth_client_factory(email="tenant_b@test.com")
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# Tenant B creates a bot
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bot_resp = await client_b.post("/api/v1/platform/bots", json={
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"name": "Tenant B Bot",
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"enabled": True
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})
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assert bot_resp.status_code == 200
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bot_uuid = bot_resp.json()["data"]["uuid"]
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# Tenant A tries to access Tenant B's bot
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resp = await client_a.get(f"/api/v1/platform/bots/{bot_uuid}")
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assert resp.status_code == 404 # Not found (membership hiding)
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# Tenant A tries to delete Tenant B's bot
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resp = await client_a.delete(f"/api/v1/platform/bots/{bot_uuid}")
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assert resp.status_code == 404
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_viewer_role_is_read_only(auth_client_factory):
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"""Viewer role can read but not modify workspace resources."""
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owner = await auth_client_factory(email="owner@test.com")
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# Owner invites a viewer
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invite_resp = await owner.post("/api/v1/workspaces/current/invitations", json={
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"email": "viewer@test.com",
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"role": "viewer"
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})
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assert invite_resp.status_code == 200
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token = invite_resp.json()["data"]["token"]
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# Viewer accepts invitation
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viewer = await auth_client_factory(email="viewer@test.com")
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await viewer.post(f"/api/v1/workspaces/invitations/{token}/accept")
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# Viewer can read bots
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resp = await viewer.get("/api/v1/platform/bots")
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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# Viewer cannot create bots
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resp = await viewer.post("/api/v1/platform/bots", json={"name": "Test Bot"})
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assert resp.status_code == 403
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# Viewer cannot modify providers
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resp = await viewer.post("/api/v1/provider/providers", json={"name": "Test Provider"})
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assert resp.status_code == 403
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_removed_member_loses_access(auth_client_factory):
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"""Removed workspace member loses API access immediately."""
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owner = await auth_client_factory(email="owner@test.com")
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member = await auth_client_factory(email="member@test.com")
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# Owner invites member
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invite_resp = await owner.post("/api/v1/workspaces/current/invitations", json={
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"email": "member@test.com",
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"role": "developer"
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})
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token = invite_resp.json()["data"]["token"]
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await member.post(f"/api/v1/workspaces/invitations/{token}/accept")
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# Member can access workspace resources
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resp = await member.get("/api/v1/platform/bots")
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assert resp.status_code == 200
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# Owner removes member
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memberships = await owner.get("/api/v1/workspaces/current/members")
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member_uuid = next(m["uuid"] for m in memberships.json()["data"]["members"]
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if m["account_email"] == "member@test.com")
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await owner.delete(f"/api/v1/workspaces/current/members/{member_uuid}")
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# Member immediately loses access
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resp = await member.get("/api/v1/platform/bots")
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assert resp.status_code == 403
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_model_provider_credentials_isolated(auth_client_factory):
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"""Model provider credentials are isolated per workspace."""
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client_a = await auth_client_factory(email="tenant_a@test.com")
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client_b = await auth_client_factory(email="tenant_b@test.com")
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# Tenant A creates provider with API key
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provider_resp = await client_a.post("/api/v1/provider/providers", json={
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"name": "OpenAI",
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"type": "openai",
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"api_key": "sk-tenant-a-secret-key"
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})
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assert provider_resp.status_code == 200
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provider_uuid = provider_resp.json()["data"]["uuid"]
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# Tenant B cannot see Tenant A's provider
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resp = await client_b.get(f"/api/v1/provider/providers/{provider_uuid}")
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assert resp.status_code == 404
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# Tenant B cannot list Tenant A's provider
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providers = await client_b.get("/api/v1/provider/providers")
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assert provider_uuid not in [p["uuid"] for p in providers.json()["data"]["providers"]]
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_websocket_messages_not_leaked_across_tenants(auth_client_factory, websocket_connect):
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"""WebSocket messages are isolated to workspace."""
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client_a = await auth_client_factory(email="tenant_a@test.com")
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client_b = await auth_client_factory(email="tenant_b@test.com")
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# Both create bots
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bot_a_resp = await client_a.post("/api/v1/platform/bots", json={"name": "Bot A"})
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bot_b_resp = await client_b.post("/api/v1/platform/bots", json={"name": "Bot B"})
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bot_a_uuid = bot_a_resp.json()["data"]["uuid"]
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bot_b_uuid = bot_b_resp.json()["data"]["uuid"]
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# Connect WebSockets
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ws_a = await websocket_connect(client_a, f"/api/v1/pipeline/websocket/{bot_a_uuid}")
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ws_b = await websocket_connect(client_b, f"/api/v1/pipeline/websocket/{bot_b_uuid}")
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# Send message from Tenant A
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await ws_a.send_json({"message": "Hello from Tenant A"})
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# Tenant B should not receive Tenant A's message
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# (Only their own bot's response)
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import asyncio
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try:
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msg = await asyncio.wait_for(ws_b.receive_json(), timeout=1.0)
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assert "Tenant A" not in str(msg), "Message leaked across tenants!"
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except asyncio.TimeoutError:
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pass # Expected - no cross-tenant messages
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@pytest.mark.asyncio
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async def test_invitation_token_workspace_scoped(auth_client_factory):
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"""Invitation tokens are scoped to specific workspace."""
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workspace_a_owner = await auth_client_factory(email="owner_a@test.com")
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workspace_b_owner = await auth_client_factory(email="owner_b@test.com")
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# Workspace A creates invitation for user@test.com
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invite_resp = await workspace_a_owner.post("/api/v1/workspaces/current/invitations", json={
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"email": "user@test.com",
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"role": "developer"
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})
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token_a = invite_resp.json()["data"]["token"]
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# User tries to accept invitation in context of Workspace B
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user = await auth_client_factory(email="user@test.com")
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# Switch user's context to Workspace B
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workspaces = await user.get("/api/v1/workspaces")
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workspace_b_uuid = next(w["uuid"] for w in workspaces.json()["data"]["workspaces"]
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if w["created_by_account_email"] == "owner_b@test.com")
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# Accept with wrong workspace context should fail
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resp = await user.post(
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f"/api/v1/workspaces/invitations/{token_a}/accept",
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headers={"X-Workspace-ID": workspace_b_uuid}
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)
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assert resp.status_code in [400, 404] # Token doesn't belong to this workspace
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