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48 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
48 lines
3.0 KiB
Markdown
# Shared runtime source candidate (SDK >=0.7.4)
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This source declares shared-runtime-v1 and stateless-v1. It is not certified or a claim of live vendor acceptance.
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The exact archive requires independent review, signer approval, and two-Workspace invocation acceptance.
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- Configuration and credentials are read per invocation. No SDK process-global
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settings are modified.
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- Host-managed state and the SDK connection binding supply authority. User config
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strings and adapter business parameters are not tenant identity.
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- Explicit HTTP(S) self-hosted endpoints remain supported, including private service
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addresses. Endpoint validation is syntax validation, NOT an SSRF/network sandbox.
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Shared deployments MUST enforce their own egress policy against metadata/control
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endpoints and foreign tenant services. Do not certify a deployment without that
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network-policy evidence. Environment HTTP proxies are no longer implicitly inherited.
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- Redirects are not followed by HTTP clients. Configure the final endpoint/attachment
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URL; redirect-dependent workflows must update their URL rather than forwarding
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credentials to an unreviewed destination.
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- Tests use installed SDK types and actual local transports/processes, with explicitly
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simulated vendor replies. They are not paid/live vendor-account tests.
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## Upstream identity migration
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The identity is derived from the current invocation's trusted SDK installation
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binding; the connection binding is only the dedicated-worker fallback, and a
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shared worker whose invocation carries no binding refuses the call instead of
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falling back to a weaker scope. With that authority,
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upstream user IDs are deterministic `lb_` SHA-256 names scoped to that authority.
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The same actor/legacy launcher in different installations/Workspaces no longer
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collides. Dedicated OSS without either scope retains the existing legacy IDs.
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Existing vendor conversations associated with the old unscoped user may require
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a new conversation after upgrading; no automatic cross-user memory migration is
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performed. Host-scoped state is not copied between tenants. A run whose sender is
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not a trusted Host actor is refused before any outbound call instead of minting a
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per-run vendor user; a conversation-scoped vendor user must be selected explicitly
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through this plugin's `user-id-source` legacy mode.
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## Synchronous vendor SDK isolation
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Every SDK operation executes in a new killable Python subprocess, using only the
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request's credentials and a minimal environment. Linux/Unix `resource` support is
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required; native Windows is not supported by this candidate. Worker address-space
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budget is 512 MiB; frame budget 1 MiB; stream budget 16 MiB. OS pipes apply bounded
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backpressure. Timeout, cancellation and early close kill/reap the child before
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returning. Host run concurrency/cgroup limits remain necessary. No daemon threads
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or executor uploads survive cancellation. Parent-owned private temporary directories
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are removed after reaping, including killed Tbox uploads. This is not proof of the
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production nsjail subprocess/rlimit policy; exercise that policy before signing.
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