Files
LangBot/tests/manual/mcp_smoke.py
T
RockChinQ e1ac5e0fc8 feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00

150 lines
5.5 KiB
Python

"""End-to-end test: boot the real MCPMount on a port and drive it with an MCP client.
Exercises the ASGI dispatcher (auth + /mcp routing), the FastMCP streamable-HTTP
transport, and a real tool call against the (mocked) service layer.
Run: uv run --no-sync python tests/manual/mcp_smoke.py
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import contextlib
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock
from hypercorn.asyncio import serve
from hypercorn.config import Config
from quart import Quart
from langbot.pkg.api.mcp.mount import MCPMount
from langbot.pkg.api.http.authz import Permission
from langbot.pkg.api.http.service.apikey import ApiKeyIdentity
PORT = 5399
GLOBAL_KEY = 'test-global-key-123'
def build_ap() -> SimpleNamespace:
ap = SimpleNamespace()
ap.instance_config = SimpleNamespace(
data={'api': {'global_api_key': GLOBAL_KEY}, 'system': {'edition': 'community', 'instance_id': 'inst-1'}}
)
ap.ver_mgr = SimpleNamespace(get_current_version=lambda: '4.5.0-test')
ap.logger = SimpleNamespace(info=print, error=print, warning=print)
# API key authentication derives the trusted Workspace carried into tools.
async def authenticate_api_key(key: str) -> ApiKeyIdentity | None:
if key != GLOBAL_KEY:
return None
return ApiKeyIdentity(
instance_uuid='inst-1',
workspace_uuid='workspace-1',
placement_generation=1,
api_key_uuid='global-test-key',
permissions=frozenset(permission.value for permission in Permission),
)
ap.apikey_service = SimpleNamespace(authenticate_api_key=authenticate_api_key)
@contextlib.asynccontextmanager
async def tenant_scope(workspace_uuid: str):
assert workspace_uuid == 'workspace-1'
yield
ap.persistence_mgr = SimpleNamespace(tenant_scope=tenant_scope)
ap.bot_service = SimpleNamespace(
get_bots=AsyncMock(return_value=[{'uuid': 'bot-1', 'name': 'Demo Bot', 'adapter': 'telegram'}])
)
ap.pipeline_service = SimpleNamespace(get_pipelines=AsyncMock(return_value=[{'uuid': 'pl-1', 'name': 'default'}]))
ap.llm_model_service = SimpleNamespace(get_llm_models=AsyncMock(return_value=[]))
ap.embedding_models_service = SimpleNamespace(get_embedding_models=AsyncMock(return_value=[]))
ap.provider_service = SimpleNamespace(get_providers=AsyncMock(return_value=[]))
ap.knowledge_service = SimpleNamespace(get_knowledge_bases=AsyncMock(return_value=[]))
ap.mcp_service = SimpleNamespace(get_mcp_servers=AsyncMock(return_value=[]))
ap.skill_service = SimpleNamespace(list_skills=AsyncMock(return_value=[{'name': 'demo-skill'}]))
return ap
async def run_server(mount: MCPMount, shutdown: asyncio.Event) -> None:
quart_app = Quart(__name__)
@quart_app.route('/healthz')
async def healthz():
return {'code': 0, 'msg': 'ok'}
config = Config()
config.bind = [f'127.0.0.1:{PORT}']
config.accesslog = None
asgi = mount.wrap(quart_app)
await serve(asgi, config, shutdown_trigger=shutdown.wait)
async def main() -> int:
from mcp.client.session import ClientSession
from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamablehttp_client
ap = build_ap()
mount = MCPMount(ap)
await mount.start_session_manager()
shutdown = asyncio.Event()
server_task = asyncio.create_task(run_server(mount, shutdown))
await asyncio.sleep(1.0) # let the server bind
url = f'http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/mcp'
failures = []
# 1. Unauthorized request is rejected.
import httpx
async with httpx.AsyncClient() as client:
r = await client.post(url, json={'jsonrpc': '2.0', 'id': 1, 'method': 'ping'})
if r.status_code != 401:
failures.append(f'expected 401 without key, got {r.status_code}')
else:
print('PASS: unauthorized request rejected (401)')
# 2. Authorized MCP session: list tools + call two.
headers = {'X-API-Key': GLOBAL_KEY}
async with streamablehttp_client(url, headers=headers) as (read, write, _):
async with ClientSession(read, write) as session:
await session.initialize()
tools = await session.list_tools()
names = [t.name for t in tools.tools]
print(f'PASS: listed {len(names)} tools')
for required in ('list_bots', 'get_system_info', 'list_skills'):
if required not in names:
failures.append(f'missing tool {required}')
res = await session.call_tool('list_bots', {})
text = res.content[0].text if res.content else ''
if 'Demo Bot' not in text:
failures.append(f'list_bots did not return expected data: {text!r}')
else:
print('PASS: list_bots returned bot data')
res2 = await session.call_tool('get_system_info', {})
text2 = res2.content[0].text if res2.content else ''
if '4.5.0-test' not in text2:
failures.append(f'get_system_info wrong: {text2!r}')
else:
print('PASS: get_system_info returned version')
shutdown.set()
with contextlib.suppress(Exception):
await asyncio.wait_for(server_task, timeout=5)
await mount.stop_session_manager()
if failures:
print('\nFAILURES:')
for f in failures:
print(' -', f)
return 1
print('\nALL MCP SMOKE CHECKS PASSED')
return 0
if __name__ == '__main__':
raise SystemExit(asyncio.run(main()))