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RockChinQ
105 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
105 lines
5.2 KiB
Markdown
# Certified Plugins
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## Admission boundary
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Core verifies a plugin archive **before** artifact storage, `PluginSetting`
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persistence, or a Plugin Runtime apply request. It calls the SDK public
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`langbot_plugin.certification.verify_archive()` API, which reads the strict
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certificate envelope from the ZIP comment and verifies the signed normalized
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ZIP digest without extracting the payload.
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Core retains the artifact SHA-256, normalized digest
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(`normalized_zip_digest()`), verification state, declared shared-runtime
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profile, key ID, selected admission profile, and stable admission code in the
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durable plugin `install_info._certification` record. The record belongs to the
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installation row; no schema migration is needed for this additive JSON
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metadata.
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## Trusted issuer configuration
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Configure the non-secret Ed25519 public-key ring in `data/config.yaml`:
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```yaml
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plugin:
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certification:
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trusted_public_keys:
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issuer-2026-q3: "<base64 encoded 32-byte Ed25519 public key>"
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```
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Key IDs must match the SDK envelope. Values are standard base64 raw public
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keys, not private/signing keys. An invalid key-ring configuration is rejected
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rather than weakening verification. Keep active issuer keys during a rotation
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until archives signed by retired IDs are no longer installed.
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The ring may also be supplied out-of-band, which is how hosted deployments
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provision it:
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```bash
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PLUGIN__CERTIFICATION__TRUSTED_PUBLIC_KEYS_JSON='{"ed25519:issuer":"<base64>"}'
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```
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An **empty** ring is a supported state, not a misconfiguration. OSS defaults to
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it, so a self-hosted instance that has not provisioned any issuer key still
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installs packages (see the admission matrix below). Configure the ring to grant
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the shared-runtime profile; leave it empty to keep every package on the
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dedicated profile.
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## Admission matrix
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| Deployment | SDK verification | Explicit `administrator_force` | Result |
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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
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| Cloud | valid envelope declaring `shared-runtime-v1` | any | admitted to the shared profile |
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| Cloud | absent | any | reject before storage with `CERTIFIED_PLUGIN_CLOUD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED` |
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| Cloud | malformed, untrusted, invalid, or non-shared | any | reject before storage with `CERTIFIED_PLUGIN_CLOUD_CERTIFICATE_INVALID` |
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| OSS | absent legacy envelope | any | admitted to the dedicated profile |
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| OSS | valid envelope declaring `shared-runtime-v1` | any | selected shared profile |
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| OSS | declaration signed by a **key this instance resolves** | false | reject with `CERTIFIED_PLUGIN_OSS_FORCE_REQUIRED` |
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| OSS | declaration signed by a **key this instance resolves** | true | admitted to the dedicated profile |
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| OSS | declaration this instance **cannot resolve** (empty ring) | any | admitted to the dedicated profile |
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The OSS row that matters for availability is the last one. Marketplace
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packages are signed by the marketplace issuer and declare
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`shared-runtime-v1`, while OSS ships an empty key ring by default. Treating that
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as a rejection made every certified marketplace package uninstallable with
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`CERTIFIED_PLUGIN_OSS_FORCE_REQUIRED` before artifact storage. Because the
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certificate is signed by an issuer the instance does not declare trusted, no
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shared-runtime privilege may be granted, so admission degrades the install to
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the existing `oss_dev` dedicated profile and records
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`CERTIFIED_PLUGIN_OSS_UNTRUSTED_DEDICATED`. This is not an escalation: it
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withholds the shared profile rather than granting it.
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A declaration is "resolvable" only when its `key_id` is present in the
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configured ring. When the ring is configured and the declaration still fails
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(malformed, `signature_invalid`, `digest_mismatch`, `unsupported_schema`, ...),
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admission stays explicit and requires `administrator_force`.
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`administrator_force` is deliberately strict: it is recognized only when the
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install request carries boolean `true`. The local upload endpoint accepts the
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multipart field `administrator_force=true`; GitHub and marketplace install
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payloads carry the same field. The existing resource-manage authorization fence
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protects those endpoints. A force never creates a Cloud dedicated fallback.
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## Runtime and logs
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SDK 0.6.2 carries an installation-level execution mode in both apply and
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authoritative reconcile payloads. Core selects `shared-runtime-v1` only when
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the persisted certification record says verification was valid, both the
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certificate and admission profiles are `shared-runtime-v1`, the admission code
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is shared-eligible, and the record's artifact SHA-256 exactly matches the
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installation row. Missing, malformed, stale, invalid, or dedicated admission
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facts select `dedicated`. Install, upgrade, configuration revision, restart,
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and reconnect all use this same persisted-fact derivation.
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The existing public plugin-log boundary already applies the immutable
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installation binding (including workspace UUID) through
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`RuntimeConnectionHandler.installation_scope()` before requesting logs. This is
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the actual tenant exposure boundary, so valid shared certificates use that
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binding-scoped transport; Core does not invent a second log stream or expose
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process-wide log output. Dedicated and invalid/legacy installations use the
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same existing installation scope.
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## SDK versioning
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Core pins `langbot-plugin==0.6.2`, the first published SDK release carrying the
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canonical installation execution-mode contract.
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