Files
LangBot/tests/integration/api/test_plugins_security.py
T
RockChinQ e1ac5e0fc8 feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00

273 lines
10 KiB
Python

"""Security regression tests for plugin configuration HTTP responses."""
from __future__ import annotations
import copy
from types import SimpleNamespace
from unittest.mock import AsyncMock, Mock, call
import pytest
import quart
pytestmark = pytest.mark.integration
WORKSPACE_UUID = '11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111'
RAW_CONFIG = {
'apiKey': 'api-secret',
'nested': {
'headers': {'Authorization': 'Bearer nested-secret', 'Accept': 'application/json'},
'refresh_token': 'refresh-secret',
'public_key': 'public-material',
'tokenizer': 'not-a-secret',
},
'credentials': {'username': 'service-user', 'password': 'service-password'},
'secret_list': ['first-secret', {'value': 'second-secret'}],
'empty_secret': '',
'enabled': True,
}
def _access(account_uuid: str):
roles = {
'viewer-account': 'viewer',
'operator-account': 'operator',
'manager-account': 'developer',
}
return SimpleNamespace(
workspace=SimpleNamespace(uuid=WORKSPACE_UUID),
membership=SimpleNamespace(
uuid=f'membership-{account_uuid}',
role=roles[account_uuid],
projection_revision=1,
),
execution=SimpleNamespace(instance_uuid='instance-test', placement_generation=1),
)
@pytest.fixture(scope='module')
def plugin_module():
"""Import the plugin router without following the core HTTP cycle."""
from tests.utils.import_isolation import MockLifecycleControlScope, isolated_sys_modules
class FakeMinimalApplication:
pass
mock_app = Mock(Application=FakeMinimalApplication)
mock_entities = Mock(LifecycleControlScope=MockLifecycleControlScope)
clear = [
'langbot.pkg.core.taskmgr',
'langbot.pkg.api.http.controller.group',
'langbot.pkg.api.http.controller.groups',
'langbot.pkg.api.http.controller.groups.plugins',
'langbot.pkg.api.http.controller.main',
]
with isolated_sys_modules(
mocks={
'langbot.pkg.core.app': mock_app,
'langbot.pkg.core.entities': mock_entities,
},
clear=clear,
):
import langbot.pkg.api.http.controller.groups.plugins as plugins
yield plugins
@pytest.fixture
async def plugin_security_api(plugin_module):
viewer = SimpleNamespace(uuid='viewer-account', user='viewer@example.com')
operator = SimpleNamespace(uuid='operator-account', user='operator@example.com')
manager = SimpleNamespace(uuid='manager-account', user='manager@example.com')
accounts = {
'viewer-token': viewer,
'operator-token': operator,
'manager-token': manager,
}
application = Mock()
application.deployment = SimpleNamespace(multi_workspace_enabled=False)
application.user_service.get_authenticated_account = AsyncMock(side_effect=lambda token: accounts[token])
application.workspace_collaboration_service.resolve_account_workspace = AsyncMock(
side_effect=lambda account_uuid, _workspace_uuid: _access(account_uuid)
)
application.apikey_service.verify_api_key = AsyncMock(return_value=False)
application.instance_config.data = {
'plugin': {'display_plugin_debug_url': 'http://localhost:5401'},
'system': {'limitation': {}},
}
raw_plugin = {
'author': 'example',
'name': 'secure-plugin',
'plugin_config': RAW_CONFIG,
'debug': {'plugin_debug_key': 'list-debug-secret'},
}
application.plugin_connector.require_workspace_context = AsyncMock()
application.plugin_connector.list_plugins = AsyncMock(return_value=[raw_plugin])
application.plugin_connector.get_plugin_info = AsyncMock(return_value=raw_plugin)
application.plugin_connector.get_debug_info = AsyncMock(return_value={'plugin_debug_key': 'runtime-debug-secret'})
application.plugin_connector.get_plugin_logs = AsyncMock(return_value=['private runtime line'])
application.plugin_connector.set_plugin_config = AsyncMock()
persistence_result = Mock()
persistence_result.scalar_one_or_none.return_value = RAW_CONFIG
application.persistence_mgr.execute_async = AsyncMock(return_value=persistence_result)
application.persistence_mgr.tenant_uow = None
quart_app = quart.Quart(__name__)
router = plugin_module.PluginsRouterGroup(application, quart_app)
await router.initialize()
return application, quart_app.test_client(), raw_plugin
def _headers(token: str) -> dict[str, str]:
return {
'Authorization': f'Bearer {token}',
'X-Workspace-Id': WORKSPACE_UUID,
}
def test_recursive_redaction_preserves_structure_without_mutating_input(plugin_module):
redacted = plugin_module.redact_plugin_secrets(RAW_CONFIG)
assert redacted['apiKey'] == '***'
assert redacted['nested']['headers'] == {
'Authorization': '***',
'Accept': 'application/json',
}
assert redacted['nested']['refresh_token'] == '***'
assert redacted['nested']['public_key'] == 'public-material'
assert redacted['nested']['tokenizer'] == 'not-a-secret'
assert redacted['credentials'] == {'username': '***', 'password': '***'}
assert redacted['secret_list'] == ['***', {'value': '***'}]
assert redacted['empty_secret'] == ''
assert redacted['enabled'] is True
assert RAW_CONFIG['apiKey'] == 'api-secret'
assert RAW_CONFIG['nested']['headers']['Authorization'] == 'Bearer nested-secret'
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match='no existing value'):
plugin_module.restore_plugin_secret_placeholders({'api_key': '***'}, {})
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_viewer_plugin_reads_are_recursively_redacted(plugin_security_api):
application, client, raw_plugin = plugin_security_api
list_response = await client.get('/api/v1/plugins', headers=_headers('viewer-token'))
detail_response = await client.get(
'/api/v1/plugins/example/secure-plugin',
headers=_headers('viewer-token'),
)
config_response = await client.get(
'/api/v1/plugins/example/secure-plugin/config',
headers=_headers('viewer-token'),
)
assert list_response.status_code == 200
assert detail_response.status_code == 200
assert config_response.status_code == 200
listed_plugin = (await list_response.get_json())['data']['plugins'][0]
detailed_plugin = (await detail_response.get_json())['data']['plugin']
config = (await config_response.get_json())['data']['config']
for plugin in (listed_plugin, detailed_plugin):
assert plugin['plugin_config']['apiKey'] == '***'
assert plugin['debug']['plugin_debug_key'] == '***'
assert config['apiKey'] == '***'
assert config['nested']['headers']['Authorization'] == '***'
assert raw_plugin['plugin_config']['apiKey'] == 'api-secret'
application.plugin_connector.require_workspace_context.assert_awaited()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_manager_read_is_redacted_but_write_preserves_or_replaces_secrets(
plugin_security_api,
plugin_module,
):
application, client, _ = plugin_security_api
read_response = await client.get(
'/api/v1/plugins/example/secure-plugin/config',
headers=_headers('manager-token'),
)
masked_update = plugin_module.redact_plugin_secrets(RAW_CONFIG)
masked_update['enabled'] = False
preserved_write = await client.put(
'/api/v1/plugins/example/secure-plugin/config',
headers=_headers('manager-token'),
json=masked_update,
)
replacement = copy.deepcopy(RAW_CONFIG)
replacement['apiKey'] = 'replacement-secret'
replaced_write = await client.put(
'/api/v1/plugins/example/secure-plugin/config',
headers=_headers('manager-token'),
json=replacement,
)
preserved = copy.deepcopy(RAW_CONFIG)
preserved['enabled'] = False
assert read_response.status_code == 200
assert (await read_response.get_json())['data']['config']['apiKey'] == '***'
assert preserved_write.status_code == 200
assert replaced_write.status_code == 200
assert application.plugin_connector.set_plugin_config.await_args_list == [
call('example', 'secure-plugin', preserved),
call('example', 'secure-plugin', replacement),
]
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_debug_key_requires_resource_manage_permission(plugin_security_api):
application, client, _ = plugin_security_api
viewer_denied = await client.get('/api/v1/plugins/debug-info', headers=_headers('viewer-token'))
operator_denied = await client.get('/api/v1/plugins/debug-info', headers=_headers('operator-token'))
application.plugin_connector.get_debug_info.assert_not_awaited()
allowed = await client.get('/api/v1/plugins/debug-info', headers=_headers('manager-token'))
assert viewer_denied.status_code == 403
assert operator_denied.status_code == 403
assert allowed.status_code == 200
assert (await allowed.get_json())['data'] == {
'debug_url': 'http://localhost:5401',
'plugin_debug_key': 'runtime-debug-secret',
}
application.plugin_connector.get_debug_info.assert_awaited_once_with()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_viewer_cannot_read_plugin_runtime_logs(plugin_security_api):
application, client, _ = plugin_security_api
response = await client.get(
'/api/v1/plugins/example/secure-plugin/logs',
headers=_headers('viewer-token'),
)
assert response.status_code == 403
assert (await response.get_json())['code'] == 'permission_denied'
application.plugin_connector.get_plugin_logs.assert_not_awaited()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_github_install_rejects_internal_asset_url_before_task_creation(
plugin_security_api,
):
application, client, _ = plugin_security_api
response = await client.post(
'/api/v1/plugins/install/github',
headers=_headers('manager-token'),
json={
'asset_url': 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data',
'owner': 'langbot-app',
'repo': 'demo-plugin',
'release_tag': 'v1.0.0',
},
)
assert response.status_code == 400
assert 'HTTPS GitHub release asset URL' in (await response.get_json())['msg']
application.task_mgr.create_user_task.assert_not_called()