Files
LangBot/src/langbot/pkg/telemetry/telemetry.py
T
RockChinQ e1ac5e0fc8 feat(tenancy): add Workspace multi-tenant foundation (#2353)
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture

* Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries

* docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture

* feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation

* docs(tenancy): record verification evidence

* docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology

* docs(tenancy): refine architecture options

* docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions

* feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations

* feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps

* docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification

* feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane

* fix(build): install git for pinned SDK

* docs(cloud): update control plane verification

* chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin

* fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup

* test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures

* fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context

* fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info

* feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation

* test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu

* feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar

* refactor(web): streamline workspace controls

* style(web): format workspace layout test

* fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status

* fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts

* fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher

* fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher

* fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries

* feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch

* style: format collaboration changes

* fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW

* fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state

* test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration

* feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience

* style(web): format invitation flows

* fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload

* feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows

* style: format OSS account service

* test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff

* fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session

* feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources

* fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms

* fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes

* fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings

* fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery

* fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work

* fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification

* fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK

* fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability

* fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2)

- Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY
- Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement
- Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys
- Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review

docs: add comprehensive database migration guide
- Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant
- Backup, execution, verification procedures
- Rollback scenarios and recovery plans
- Performance tuning recommendations

* test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests

Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries:
- Cross-tenant bot access prevention
- Viewer role read-only enforcement
- Removed member immediate access revocation
- Model provider credential isolation
- WebSocket message isolation
- Invitation token workspace scoping
- Multi-workspace context validation

These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for:
- workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows)
- user.py (authentication & authorization)
- websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation)
- plugins.py (resource access control)

docs: finalize database migration guide

* fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings

M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED)
- Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext
- Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window
- Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap

M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED)
- Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource)
- Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible
- No code change needed, documented as working correctly

M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED)
- Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest
- Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B
- Locks now isolated per workspace

All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved.

* fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas

* fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync

---------

Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-30 21:43:35 +08:00

181 lines
7.2 KiB
Python

from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import contextlib
import httpx
from ..core import app as core_app
from ..utils import httpclient
_MAX_INFLIGHT_TELEMETRY_TASKS = 8
class TelemetryManager:
"""TelemetryManager handles sending telemetry for a given application instance.
Usage:
telemetry = TelemetryManager(ap)
await telemetry.send({ ... })
"""
def __init__(self, ap: core_app.Application):
self.ap = ap
self.telemetry_config = {}
self.send_tasks: list[asyncio.Task] = []
self._client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None
async def initialize(self):
self.telemetry_config = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('space', {})
async def start_send_task(self, payload: dict):
self.send_tasks = [task for task in self.send_tasks if not task.done()]
if len(self.send_tasks) >= _MAX_INFLIGHT_TELEMETRY_TASKS:
self.ap.logger.debug('Telemetry queue is full; dropping best-effort event')
return
task = asyncio.create_task(self.send(payload))
self.send_tasks.append(task)
task.add_done_callback(self._send_task_done)
def _send_task_done(self, task: asyncio.Task) -> None:
try:
self.send_tasks.remove(task)
except ValueError:
pass
async def shutdown(self) -> None:
tasks = list(self.send_tasks)
for task in tasks:
task.cancel()
if tasks:
await asyncio.gather(*tasks, return_exceptions=True)
self.send_tasks.clear()
if self._client is not None:
await self._client.aclose()
self._client = None
@contextlib.asynccontextmanager
async def _client_context(self):
if self._client is None or self._client.is_closed:
self._client = httpx.AsyncClient(
timeout=httpx.Timeout(10),
event_hooks=httpclient.httpx_response_limit_hooks(),
)
yield self._client
async def send(self, payload: dict):
"""Send telemetry payload to configured telemetry server (non-blocking).
Expects ap.instance_config.data.telemetry to have:
- enabled: bool
- server: str (base URL, e.g. https://space.example.com)
- timeout_seconds: optional int, overall request timeout (default 10)
Posts to {server.rstrip('/')}/api/v1/telemetry as JSON. Failures are logged but do not raise.
"""
try:
cfg = self.telemetry_config
if not cfg:
return
if cfg.get('disable_telemetry', False):
return
server = cfg.get('url', '')
if not server:
return
# Normalize URL
url = server.rstrip('/') + '/api/v1/telemetry'
try:
# Sanitize payload so string fields are strings and not nulls
sanitized = dict(payload)
if 'query_id' in sanitized:
try:
sanitized['query_id'] = '' if sanitized['query_id'] is None else str(sanitized['query_id'])
except Exception:
sanitized['query_id'] = str(sanitized.get('query_id', ''))
for sfield in (
'adapter',
'runner',
'runner_category',
'model_name',
'version',
'edition',
'error',
'timestamp',
'event_type',
):
if sfield not in sanitized:
continue
v = sanitized.get(sfield)
sanitized[sfield] = '' if v is None else str(v)
# event_type defaults to 'query' for backward compatibility
if not sanitized.get('event_type'):
sanitized['event_type'] = 'query'
# features must be a JSON object
if 'features' in sanitized and not isinstance(sanitized['features'], dict):
sanitized['features'] = {}
if 'duration_ms' in sanitized:
try:
sanitized['duration_ms'] = (
int(sanitized['duration_ms']) if sanitized['duration_ms'] is not None else 0
)
except Exception:
sanitized['duration_ms'] = 0
async with self._client_context() as client:
try:
# Use asyncio.wait_for to ensure we always bound the total time
resp = await asyncio.wait_for(client.post(url, json=sanitized), timeout=10 + 1)
if resp.status_code >= 400:
body = await httpclient.response_text(resp, max_chars=200)
self.ap.logger.warning(
f'Telemetry post to {url} returned status {resp.status_code} - {body}'
)
else:
# Detect application-level errors inside HTTP 200 responses
app_err = False
try:
j = await httpclient.parse_json_response(resp)
if isinstance(j, dict) and j.get('code') is not None and int(j.get('code')) >= 400:
app_err = True
self.ap.logger.warning(
f'Telemetry post to {url} returned application error code {j.get("code")} - {j.get("msg")}'
)
except Exception:
pass
if app_err:
body = await httpclient.response_text(resp, max_chars=200)
self.ap.logger.warning(
f'Telemetry post to {url} returned app-level error - response: {body}'
)
else:
body = await httpclient.response_text(resp, max_chars=200)
self.ap.logger.debug(
f'Telemetry posted to {url}, status {resp.status_code} - response: {body}'
)
except asyncio.TimeoutError:
self.ap.logger.warning(f'Telemetry post to {url} timed out')
except Exception as e:
self.ap.logger.warning(f'Failed to post telemetry to {url}: {e}', exc_info=True)
except Exception as e:
try:
self.ap.logger.warning(
f'Failed to create HTTP client for telemetry or sanitize payload: {e}', exc_info=True
)
except Exception:
pass
except Exception as e:
# Never raise from telemetry; surface as warning for visibility
try:
self.ap.logger.warning(f'Unexpected telemetry error: {e}', exc_info=True)
except Exception:
pass