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https://github.com/langbot-app/LangBot.git
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e1ac5e0fc8
* Document multi-tenant workspace architecture * Add OSS and commercial workspace boundaries * docs: redesign multi-tenant workspace architecture * feat(tenancy): implement workspace isolation * docs(tenancy): record verification evidence * docs(tenancy): revise single-instance SaaS topology * docs(tenancy): refine architecture options * docs: finalize cloud v2 multi-tenant decisions * feat(tenancy): establish cloud isolation foundations * feat(tenancy): harden shared cloud runtime boundaries * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * fix(tenancy): close isolation and permission gaps * docs(tenancy): record final isolation verification * feat(tenancy): connect cloud workspace control plane * fix(build): install git for pinned SDK * docs(cloud): update control plane verification * chore: update multi-tenant SDK pin * fix(cloud): skip legacy model sync during startup * test(cloud): preserve minimal model manager fixtures * fix(cloud): preserve authenticated account context * fix(cloud): reuse authenticated account for user info * feat(cloud): complete Workspace settings navigation * test(web): cover Workspace dropdown menu * feat(web): place workspace controls in sidebar * refactor(web): streamline workspace controls * style(web): format workspace layout test * fix(cloud): surface runtime and workspace plan status * fix(plugin): keep runtime identity stable across restarts * fix(ui): widen and center workspace switcher * fix(ui): hide roles from workspace switcher * fix(ui): align workspace switcher with sidebar entries * feat(workspace): add in-product collaboration and direct Cloud launch * style: format collaboration changes * fix(workspace): bind collaboration APIs to tenant UoW * fix(cloud): preserve Core-owned collaboration state * test(cloud): require Space identity for invite registration * feat(cloud): complete secure invitation experience * style(web): format invitation flows * fix(cloud): recover box runtime without unscoped skill reload * feat(oss): enforce invitation account and owner billing flows * style: format OSS account service * test(oss): cover invitation logout handoff * fix(oss): resolve workspace owner in scoped session * feat(cloud): harden multi-tenant runtime resources * fix(cloud): bound runtime restart storms * fix(cloud): eliminate periodic runtime CPU spikes * fix(cloud): enforce instance capacity ceilings * fix(cloud): scope public login capability discovery * fix(cloud): bound tenant maintenance and monitoring work * fix(runtime): bound tenant resource amplification * fix(deps): pin green multi-tenant plugin SDK * fix(cloud): handle unavailable skill capability * fix(security): require authentication for image file endpoint (H-2) - Changed /api/v1/files/image from AuthType.NONE to USER_TOKEN_OR_API_KEY - Added Permission.RESOURCE_VIEW requirement - Prevents unauthenticated cross-tenant file access via leaked keys - Fixes HIGH severity finding from multi-tenant security review docs: add comprehensive database migration guide - Complete migration steps for OSS → multi-tenant - Backup, execution, verification procedures - Rollback scenarios and recovery plans - Performance tuning recommendations * test: add comprehensive cross-tenant isolation tests Added 7 critical test scenarios for multi-tenant boundaries: - Cross-tenant bot access prevention - Viewer role read-only enforcement - Removed member immediate access revocation - Model provider credential isolation - WebSocket message isolation - Invitation token workspace scoping - Multi-workspace context validation These tests address P0-2 coverage gaps for: - workspaces.py (membership & invitation flows) - user.py (authentication & authorization) - websocket_chat.py (real-time isolation) - plugins.py (resource access control) docs: finalize database migration guide * fix(security): resolve M-1, M-2, M-3 security findings M-1: WebSocket authorization TOCTOU race (FIXED) - Changed _revalidate_websocket_authorization to return RequestContext - Ensures validated context is used immediately without race window - Prevents removed members from sending messages during revalidation gap M-2: Model Manager cache workspace isolation (VERIFIED) - Confirmed _CacheKey already uses 4-tuple: (instance, workspace, generation, resource) - Cache is properly scoped per workspace, no cross-tenant leakage possible - No code change needed, documented as working correctly M-3: Invitation lock workspace scoping (FIXED) - Changed lock key from token_digest to workspace_uuid:token_digest - Prevents DoS where attacker locks token in Workspace A to block Workspace B - Locks now isolated per workspace All MEDIUM severity findings from security review now resolved. * fix(cloud): unblock tenant CI and enforce knowledge quotas * fix(tenancy): scope rerank model sync --------- Co-authored-by: dadachann <185672915+dadachann@users.noreply.github.com>
181 lines
7.2 KiB
Python
181 lines
7.2 KiB
Python
from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import contextlib
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import httpx
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from ..core import app as core_app
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from ..utils import httpclient
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_MAX_INFLIGHT_TELEMETRY_TASKS = 8
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class TelemetryManager:
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"""TelemetryManager handles sending telemetry for a given application instance.
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Usage:
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telemetry = TelemetryManager(ap)
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await telemetry.send({ ... })
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"""
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def __init__(self, ap: core_app.Application):
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self.ap = ap
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self.telemetry_config = {}
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self.send_tasks: list[asyncio.Task] = []
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self._client: httpx.AsyncClient | None = None
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async def initialize(self):
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self.telemetry_config = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('space', {})
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async def start_send_task(self, payload: dict):
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self.send_tasks = [task for task in self.send_tasks if not task.done()]
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if len(self.send_tasks) >= _MAX_INFLIGHT_TELEMETRY_TASKS:
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self.ap.logger.debug('Telemetry queue is full; dropping best-effort event')
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return
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task = asyncio.create_task(self.send(payload))
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self.send_tasks.append(task)
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task.add_done_callback(self._send_task_done)
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def _send_task_done(self, task: asyncio.Task) -> None:
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try:
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self.send_tasks.remove(task)
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except ValueError:
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pass
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async def shutdown(self) -> None:
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tasks = list(self.send_tasks)
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for task in tasks:
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task.cancel()
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if tasks:
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await asyncio.gather(*tasks, return_exceptions=True)
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self.send_tasks.clear()
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if self._client is not None:
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await self._client.aclose()
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self._client = None
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@contextlib.asynccontextmanager
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async def _client_context(self):
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if self._client is None or self._client.is_closed:
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self._client = httpx.AsyncClient(
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timeout=httpx.Timeout(10),
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event_hooks=httpclient.httpx_response_limit_hooks(),
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)
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yield self._client
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async def send(self, payload: dict):
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"""Send telemetry payload to configured telemetry server (non-blocking).
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Expects ap.instance_config.data.telemetry to have:
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- enabled: bool
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- server: str (base URL, e.g. https://space.example.com)
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- timeout_seconds: optional int, overall request timeout (default 10)
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Posts to {server.rstrip('/')}/api/v1/telemetry as JSON. Failures are logged but do not raise.
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"""
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try:
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cfg = self.telemetry_config
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if not cfg:
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return
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if cfg.get('disable_telemetry', False):
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return
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server = cfg.get('url', '')
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if not server:
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return
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# Normalize URL
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url = server.rstrip('/') + '/api/v1/telemetry'
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try:
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# Sanitize payload so string fields are strings and not nulls
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sanitized = dict(payload)
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if 'query_id' in sanitized:
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try:
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sanitized['query_id'] = '' if sanitized['query_id'] is None else str(sanitized['query_id'])
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except Exception:
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sanitized['query_id'] = str(sanitized.get('query_id', ''))
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for sfield in (
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'adapter',
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'runner',
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'runner_category',
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'model_name',
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'version',
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'edition',
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'error',
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'timestamp',
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'event_type',
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):
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if sfield not in sanitized:
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continue
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v = sanitized.get(sfield)
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sanitized[sfield] = '' if v is None else str(v)
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# event_type defaults to 'query' for backward compatibility
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if not sanitized.get('event_type'):
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sanitized['event_type'] = 'query'
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# features must be a JSON object
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if 'features' in sanitized and not isinstance(sanitized['features'], dict):
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sanitized['features'] = {}
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if 'duration_ms' in sanitized:
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try:
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sanitized['duration_ms'] = (
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int(sanitized['duration_ms']) if sanitized['duration_ms'] is not None else 0
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)
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except Exception:
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sanitized['duration_ms'] = 0
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async with self._client_context() as client:
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try:
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# Use asyncio.wait_for to ensure we always bound the total time
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resp = await asyncio.wait_for(client.post(url, json=sanitized), timeout=10 + 1)
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if resp.status_code >= 400:
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body = await httpclient.response_text(resp, max_chars=200)
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self.ap.logger.warning(
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f'Telemetry post to {url} returned status {resp.status_code} - {body}'
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)
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else:
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# Detect application-level errors inside HTTP 200 responses
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app_err = False
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try:
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j = await httpclient.parse_json_response(resp)
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if isinstance(j, dict) and j.get('code') is not None and int(j.get('code')) >= 400:
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app_err = True
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self.ap.logger.warning(
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f'Telemetry post to {url} returned application error code {j.get("code")} - {j.get("msg")}'
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)
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except Exception:
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pass
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if app_err:
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body = await httpclient.response_text(resp, max_chars=200)
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self.ap.logger.warning(
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f'Telemetry post to {url} returned app-level error - response: {body}'
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)
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else:
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body = await httpclient.response_text(resp, max_chars=200)
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self.ap.logger.debug(
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f'Telemetry posted to {url}, status {resp.status_code} - response: {body}'
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)
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except asyncio.TimeoutError:
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self.ap.logger.warning(f'Telemetry post to {url} timed out')
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except Exception as e:
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self.ap.logger.warning(f'Failed to post telemetry to {url}: {e}', exc_info=True)
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except Exception as e:
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try:
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self.ap.logger.warning(
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f'Failed to create HTTP client for telemetry or sanitize payload: {e}', exc_info=True
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)
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except Exception:
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pass
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except Exception as e:
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# Never raise from telemetry; surface as warning for visibility
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try:
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self.ap.logger.warning(f'Unexpected telemetry error: {e}', exc_info=True)
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except Exception:
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pass
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