Multi-Workspace deployments fail the public plugin icon route closed (404), so plain <img src> icons broke everywhere locally and for the runner picker in production. A shared cached hook fetches the authenticated icon for installed plugins and leaves marketplace surfaces on the cloud URL.
The SDK binds one transfer root inode (mode 0700) and picks it per profile: a shared worker uses /tmp/lbp-rpc while a host without the profile env fell back to data/temp/lbp, so plugin icons and assets died with 'Invalid file transfer capability'. The host now pins the shared root, and a plugin absent from the resolved Workspace answers 404 instead of 500.
The connector stored only uuid/code/message, so the ops reporter stamped every entry with its own sampling time and a stale failure looked freshly broken on each report. Failures now carry failed_at and the payload publishes it.
The execution trace rewrite batches records and uploads them from
ExecutionCounters.flush(), replaced the per-trace direct send, dropped the
window counters, made the execution id the record identity and records the
inbound event stage after the routing stage. The ingress tests still asserted
the old mechanism, so they failed on every Python version.
Assert what the pipeline now emits instead: flush the buffered records and read
them back, require the trace registry to be empty afterwards, assert the
deterministic execution id, expect the route stage before the inbound stage,
and give the dispatch stubs the execution_id parameter the ingress passes.
The shared Cloud deployment runs one Plugin Runtime for every Workspace, but
nothing reported its health: the instance only exposed two aggregate numbers on
its own health probe, and the per-installation failure registry, the desired
state registry and the reconcile outcome lived in memory with no reader.
Add RuntimeOpsReporter, which every 30 seconds reads the Runtime ``/healthz``
probe over HTTP (derived from ``plugin.runtime_ws_url``), merges it with the
connector's desired-state, failure and reconcile summaries, and posts one
sample to the Space control plane on the existing authenticated direction.
Delivery is best-effort and bounded: a single in-flight request, a ten second
timeout, dropped samples counted in ``runtime_ops`` on the instance health
probe, and a failed probe recorded as a drop so the dashboard shows staleness
instead of grading a stale sample as healthy.
Cloud-only: a non-cloud deployment never enables the reporter, and the channel
is independent of product telemetry so ``space.disable_telemetry`` cannot blind
the ops dashboard.
Every host step now opens a stage scope, so observations recorded inside it (including cross-task plugin/RPC calls resolved through the execution registry) carry the owning step as parent; the pipeline lane records its own pipeline/run node so acks and replies issued outside the runner still hang off a node.
close_trace() called the coroutine TelemetryManager.start_send_task without
awaiting or scheduling it, so every payload closed on that path was silently
dropped and the runtime logged "coroutine ... was never awaited". The only
other caller awaits it correctly, so both call styles stay supported: call the
manager, schedule the returned coroutine on the running loop, and close it with
a debug log when no loop is available.
Regression case added in tests/unit_tests/telemetry/test_trace.py: it fails
before this change (payload never delivered) and passes after.
Execution telemetry already reported window counters. This adds one bounded,
content-free chain per inbound platform event, so a single event can be
followed from its source platform through routing and processing to the
platform API calls it caused.
- telemetry/trace.py: ContextVar trace identity with route and run scopes, and
a 32-stage bound per chain.
- telemetry/execution.py: keeps at most 64 chains for 120s, decides sampling
from the observed outcome, and sends one payload per chain keyed by
query_id = trace_id, so Space fetches a chain by primary identity. Window
counters are unchanged and remain the source of coverage statistics.
- botmgr / pipelinemgr / orchestrator: bind the trace at the ingress boundary,
scope routing identity per dispatch, and attach the run identity, so nested
lanes (event -> route -> pipeline/runner -> platform API) reuse one chain. A
run reached without an ingress (WebUI debug, service API) owns its own chain.
- space.execution_trace selects off | failures | sampled | all (default
sampled: failures, WebUI debug runs and every N-th success).
Chains carry only code-defined identifiers (adapter and runner types, route
identity as type:uuid, run id); never message content, tool arguments or
platform user identifiers.
Carries the plugin worker process label: workers now show `--tag
author/plugin_name` in ps/htop, including the nsjail supervisor row.
Verified locally: the published wheel hash matches the pin, the shared runtime
launches workers with the tag, plugins register and knowledge retrieval is
unaffected.
scan_skill_directory is disabled for Cloud-managed sandboxes, but the
register_skill tool was still advertised to the model whenever a backend was
available, so every call failed closed without a usable explanation. Advertise
register_skill only when the runtime may scan sandbox directories, and keep
activate available in both modes.
The workspace file tools (read/write/edit/glob/grep) ran a script through
`python`, which a sandbox built from a host rootfs may not provide: those hosts
ship `python3` only, and a read-only /usr prevents creating a `python` shim
inside the jail. Every file tool then failed with `/bin/sh: 1: python: not
found`. Resolve the interpreter with `command -v python3 || command -v python`,
matching the interpreter the Box service already uses for its own scripts.
A full-text search sends no query vector by design, but search() validated
len([]) == 0 as the expected embedding dimension, so the request failed with
'Embedding dimension 0 is not enabled for this deployment' and hid the
backend capability error. An empty query vector now means no expected
dimension to verify.
The NDJSON debug stream emits its frames after the request handler returned,
so the request-scoped tenant scope is already closed by then. The deferred
execution therefore failed with TenantScopeRequiredError on its first
persistence access and the client only saw a generic runner_error frame with
no log entry.
Re-enter the Workspace tenant scope around the deferred execution and log
unexpected failures with their traceback.
Pick up the shared-worker startup and installation-binding fixes released as
langbot-plugin 0.7.5 (tag v0.7.5), so Core deployments stop installing the
0.7.4 wheel that cannot launch shared pool workers and drops the installation
binding on plugin dispatches and relays.
Passkeys and passwords belong to the Account, but those routes required a Workspace -- which the WebUI never sends for them -- and then resolved the caller by looking the login name up as an email address. Every Account whose login name is not its email answered 404, so the passkey panel could neither add nor list a key.
The routes now authenticate with the account token and address the Account the caller authenticated as, matching the self-service second-factor routes in the same file. /space/bind-authorize-url carried the same Workspace requirement.
The login page also surfaced a TypeError instead of the passkey login failure message when an assertion was rejected.
Cloud runtime refuses unscoped database access and workspace_operation_logs is row-level-secured on the bound Workspace. The background writer, the retention pass and the metadata reads all run outside a request lifetime, so each of them failed and the failure was swallowed by the best-effort handler: enabling tracing recorded nothing at all.
The route wrapper also traces after the handler released its scope, so level resolution has to carry the Workspace itself. Without it the level read back as 0 and the request was dropped before it was even queued.
The startup gate now enumerates the Workspaces through this instance's execution bindings, because a cross-Workspace metadata scan cannot see them under RLS, and it runs after the Workspace service exists. The writer starts with a clean context so it cannot inherit the scope of the request that first enqueued a trace, and a dropped write is reported instead of being logged only at debug.
The second-factor listing was instance-wide and the three mutating endpoints never checked that the target Account belongs to the caller's Workspace, so an owner or admin could see and reset another tenant's account. The listing now resolves the Workspace members and the mutations answer 404 for a foreign account, which does not disclose that it exists.
Also fixes the TOTP write path on Postgres: six write points passed timezone-aware datetimes into timestamp-without-time-zone columns, which asyncpg rejects, so every enroll, confirm, revoke and recovery-code consumption raised a 500 there. SQLite tolerated the same values.
The panel derives its oversight view from the API authorization instead of the length of the account list, which would have hidden it in a single-member Workspace.
Rename the traceability surface to "operation log", move its entry from the sidebar into the settings dialog, and collect the capture level and the retention policy in one dialog. The retention fields are shown inline instead of behind a disclosure; edits stay a draft until Save, and Reset restores the persisted policy. Copy updated across the eight locales.
- render the banner through the Alert API so its grid keeps one full-width text column instead of wrapping inside the empty icon column
- point the cloud link at space.langbot.app/cloud?environment=dedicated and the self-hosted link at the GitHub repository
- keep the last known state and retry the probe (1/2/4/8s plus a re-check on window focus) so a restarting backend cannot hide the banner for the session
- publish --beta-banner-height so the fixed sidebar container, the sidebar wrapper and the wizard shell start below the banner
RockChinQ