feat(auth): add TOTP (RFC 6238) second factor with recovery codes

- store the per-Account shared secret encrypted at rest (Fernet keyed off
  the instance JWT secret via HKDF); never persist it in plaintext
- store recovery codes only as salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 digests
- add TotpService covering enrol / verify / disable and recovery-code use
- expose the login second-factor challenge (code `totp_required`) and the
  recovery-code path in the auth / reset flows
- add the `totp_credentials` migration (0025, revises 0024_passkey_credentials)
- web: TOTP challenge step on login, TOTP / recovery-code methods on
  reset-password, TotpEnrollDialog in account settings, i18n for all locales

.github/discord-release/README.md

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-# Discord release announcements
-
-This independent workflow announces new stable LangBot releases in the channel
-selected by a dedicated Discord incoming webhook. It does not change the existing
-release/build workflows, edit releases, run a persistent service, poll, or backfill.
-Announcements run on publication, independently of artifact builds finishing.
-
-## Setup and read-only validation
-
-1. In the intended community **announcement channel**, create a dedicated incoming
-   webhook (Channel Settings → Integrations → Webhooks). Copy its URL; do not reuse
-   a webhook belonging to another automation.
-2. In `langbot-app/LangBot` → Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions, create the
-   **repository secret** `DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL`. Its value must be exactly
-   `https://discord.com/api/webhooks/<id>/<token>` — no query, trailing slash,
-   API-version segment, or alternate domain. Treat the entire URL as a password.
-3. Once this workflow is on `master`, open Actions → **Discord Release Announcement**
-   → Run workflow, choosing `master`. Alternatively:
-
-   ```sh
-   gh workflow run discord-release.yml --repo langbot-app/LangBot --ref master
-   ```
-
-4. Inspect **Validate webhook (GET only, no message)**. It checks webhook type `1`
-   and reports `guild_id` and `channel_id`; compare both with the intended server
-   and channel using Discord Developer Mode → Copy ID. The secret determines the
-   destination; no channel ID is guessed or overridden. The URL/token is never
-   logged. Dispatch cannot send a test message or announce an old release, even
-   when run again. Missing/invalid secrets fail validation clearly; offline tests
-   do not need secrets.
-
-GET validation confirms the webhook's identity, not delivery or notification
-permissions. Verify those on the first genuine release. `mention_everyone=true`
-confirms Discord parsed the mention; it cannot prove every member received a push
-notification (member/server notification settings still apply).
-
-## Activation and message
-
-The workflow and `.github/discord-release/` helper **must be in the commit targeted
-by each new release tag**. Merging to `master` does not enable announcements for
-old tags whose commits lack these files. Manual dispatch becomes available when
-the workflow is on the default branch. Only publish release tags from trusted,
-reviewed commits: release workflows execute that tag's code with the secret.
-
-Only `release` events with action `published`, `draft=false`, and
-`prerelease=false` can send. Drafts and prereleases are skipped; release edits do
-not trigger announcements. The helper requires the repository to be exactly
-`langbot-app/LangBot`, a stable `vX.Y.Z` tag (ASCII digits, at most 64 characters),
-and its exact canonical GitHub release URL. Other naming schemes fail closed.
-
-Example message (the version and URL come from the validated event file):
-
-```text
-@everyone LangBot v4.10.11 is now available!
-Release notes: https://github.com/langbot-app/LangBot/releases/tag/v4.10.11
-```
-
-The release title/body is never copied. There is one literal `@everyone`, explicit
-`allowed_mentions.parse=["everyone"]`, empty user/role allowlists, and no reply
-mention. TTS and notification-suppressing flags are disabled. Requests use HTTPS
-only to `discord.com`, an explicit User-Agent, and no redirects or automatic
-retries. After a webhook identity GET, one `POST ?wait=true` obtains a message ID;
-an exact `/messages/<id>` GET verifies its ID, webhook/channel, content,
-`mention_everyone=true`, and empty user/role mention arrays before success.
-
-## Repeat guard and manual recovery
-
-Production sending requires **`GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT == "1"`**. Any Actions rerun
-(including “Re-run failed jobs”) refuses to POST and requires manual reconciliation,
-even if the first attempt failed before sending. Read-only dispatch may be rerun.
-
-This is a practical repeat guard, **not durable exactly-once delivery**. It cannot
-prevent duplicates from a separate new run/event (for example deleting/recreating
-a release), separate automation, or manual posting. It stores no durable dedupe
-state and never modifies the release to mark delivery.
-
-If a POST times out, returns an error, or readback fails, the message may already
-exist. The workflow fails rather than blindly sending again. A returned message ID
-is included in the safe error when available. A runner termination can also leave
-an ambiguous send without that log line.
-
-1. Inspect the announcement channel and the failed run logs. Locate the canonical
-   release link and, if available, the returned message ID. A failed verification
-   does **not** mean the message was absent.
-2. If present, reconcile the existing message/mention problem manually; do not
-   rerun, create another release event, or send a duplicate ping.
-3. If an operator has positively confirmed no message exists, fix the secret or
-   permission issue and use read-only dispatch to validate configuration. A
-   maintainer may then post the announcement manually once in Discord and record
-   the message link in the incident/run notes. Do not override the attempt guard
-   or delete/recreate a release to force recovery.
-4. If absence cannot be established, pause and reconcile rather than resending.
-
-To stop future sends, disable **Discord Release Announcement** in Actions. Rotate
-or delete the dedicated Discord webhook if the URL is exposed, and update the
-secret before validation. No rollback of release artifacts is involved.
-
-## Local checks
-
-Requires Python 3.11+ and the standard library only:
-
-```sh
-python3 -m unittest discover -s .github/discord-release -p 'test_*.py' -v
-python3 -m py_compile .github/discord-release/announce.py .github/discord-release/test_announce.py
-```
-
-Tests exercise policy, CLI/event-file handling, mention payloads, hostile inputs,
-HTTP failures, exact message readback, and refusal to retry. Only the HTTPS
-transport is mocked for Discord tests; no live Discord requests or messages are
-made. Changes to this directory or its workflow run the offline tests on push and
-pull request; tests also gate release sending and read-only dispatch validation.

.github/discord-release/announce.py

@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
-"""Announce only first-attempt stable releases; dispatch is read-only validation."""
-
-import http.client
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import re
-import sys
-
-REPOSITORY = 'langbot-app/LangBot'
-RELEASE_PREFIX = f'https://github.com/{REPOSITORY}/releases/tag/'
-RECONCILE = (
-    'Do not resend or bypass the run-attempt guard; manual reconciliation is required. '
-    'Inspect the announcement channel and workflow logs before any manual recovery '
-    '(see .github/discord-release/README.md).'
-)
-
-
-class AnnouncementError(Exception):
-    """A safe, operator-facing error containing no webhook URL or response body."""
-
-
-def release_payload(event, attempt):
-    """Return a bounded, mention-safe payload, or None for draft/preview releases."""
-    if not isinstance(event, dict) or event.get('action') != 'published':
-        raise AnnouncementError('Only release.published events are accepted.')
-    repository = event.get('repository')
-    if not isinstance(repository, dict) or repository.get('full_name') != REPOSITORY:
-        raise AnnouncementError('Unexpected release repository.')
-    release = event.get('release')
-    if not isinstance(release, dict) or any(type(release.get(key)) is not bool for key in ('draft', 'prerelease')):
-        raise AnnouncementError('Invalid release flags.')
-    if release['draft'] or release['prerelease']:
-        return None
-    if attempt != '1':
-        raise AnnouncementError(f'Release reruns or missing run attempts are refused. {RECONCILE}')
-    tag = release.get('tag_name')
-    if not isinstance(tag, str) or len(tag) > 64 or not re.fullmatch(r'v[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+', tag):
-        raise AnnouncementError('Expected a stable release tag in vX.Y.Z format (at most 64 characters).')
-    url = RELEASE_PREFIX + tag
-    if release.get('html_url') != url:
-        raise AnnouncementError('Release URL must be the canonical LangBot release URL matching its tag.')
-    return {
-        'content': f'@everyone LangBot {tag} is now available!\nRelease notes: {url}',
-        'allowed_mentions': {'parse': ['everyone'], 'users': [], 'roles': [], 'replied_user': False},
-        'tts': False,
-        'flags': 0,
-    }
-
-
-def is_snowflake(value):
-    return isinstance(value, str) and re.fullmatch(r'[0-9]{1,20}', value) is not None
-
-
-class DiscordWebhook:
-    def __init__(self, url):
-        if not url:
-            raise AnnouncementError('DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL is missing. Set the repository Actions secret.')
-        match = re.fullmatch(r'https://discord\.com(/api/webhooks/([0-9]{1,20})/[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)', url)
-        if not match:
-            raise AnnouncementError('Invalid webhook URL; expected https://discord.com/api/webhooks/<id>/<token>.')
-        self.path, self.id = match.groups()
-
-    def _request(self, method, suffix='', payload=None):
-        # Direct HTTPS, default certificate verification, no proxies or redirect/retry machinery.
-        connection = http.client.HTTPSConnection('discord.com', timeout=20)
-        try:
-            body = json.dumps(payload).encode('utf-8') if payload is not None else None
-            connection.request(
-                method,
-                self.path + suffix,
-                body=body,
-                headers={'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'User-Agent': 'LangBot-Release-Announcements/1.0'},
-            )
-            response = connection.getresponse()
-            if response.status != 200:
-                raise AnnouncementError(f'Discord {method} returned HTTP {response.status}; no retry was attempted.')
-            raw = response.read(1_048_577)
-            if len(raw) > 1_048_576:
-                raise AnnouncementError('Discord response exceeded the size limit.')
-            return json.loads(raw)
-        except (OSError, http.client.HTTPException, ValueError, UnicodeError):
-            # Exceptions and bodies can contain the token; never print them or chain them.
-            raise AnnouncementError(
-                f'Discord {method} failed or returned invalid JSON; no retry was attempted.'
-            ) from None
-        finally:
-            connection.close()
-
-    def validate(self):
-        """GET only: verify an incoming webhook and return safe identifying fields."""
-        webhook = self._request('GET')
-        if (
-            not isinstance(webhook, dict)
-            or type(webhook.get('type')) is not int
-            or webhook['type'] != 1
-            or webhook.get('id') != self.id
-            or not is_snowflake(webhook.get('guild_id'))
-            or not is_snowflake(webhook.get('channel_id'))
-        ):
-            raise AnnouncementError('Expected an incoming (type 1) webhook with matching ID and guild/channel IDs.')
-        return {key: webhook[key] for key in ('id', 'type', 'guild_id', 'channel_id')}
-
-    def send(self, payload):
-        """One POST, followed by exact message GET; never automatically retry a send."""
-        webhook = self.validate()
-        message_id = None
-        try:
-            sent = self._request('POST', '?wait=true', payload)
-            if not isinstance(sent, dict) or not is_snowflake(sent.get('id')):
-                raise AnnouncementError('Discord did not return a valid message ID.')
-            message_id = sent['id']
-            saved = self._request('GET', f'/messages/{message_id}')
-            if (
-                not isinstance(saved, dict)
-                or saved.get('id') != message_id
-                or saved.get('webhook_id') != self.id
-                or saved.get('channel_id') != webhook['channel_id']
-                or saved.get('content') != payload['content']
-                or saved.get('mention_everyone') is not True
-                or saved.get('mentions') != []
-                or saved.get('mention_roles') != []
-            ):
-                raise AnnouncementError('Discord message readback did not match content, identity, or mentions.')
-        except AnnouncementError as error:
-            reference = f' Returned message ID: {message_id}.' if message_id else ''
-            raise AnnouncementError(f'Delivery not confirmed. {error}{reference} {RECONCILE}') from None
-        return message_id
-
-
-def main(env=None):
-    env = os.environ if env is None else env
-    try:
-        if env.get('GITHUB_REPOSITORY') != REPOSITORY:
-            raise AnnouncementError('This workflow is restricted to langbot-app/LangBot.')
-        name = env.get('GITHUB_EVENT_NAME')
-        if name == 'workflow_dispatch':
-            webhook = DiscordWebhook(env.get('DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL')).validate()
-            print(
-                f'Validated incoming webhook: guild_id={webhook["guild_id"]} channel_id={webhook["channel_id"]}. No message sent.'
-            )
-            return 0
-        if name != 'release':
-            raise AnnouncementError('Only release and workflow_dispatch events are accepted by this helper.')
-        try:
-            event = json.loads(Path(env.get('GITHUB_EVENT_PATH', '')).read_text(encoding='utf-8'))
-        except (OSError, ValueError, UnicodeError):
-            raise AnnouncementError('Cannot read a valid JSON release event from GITHUB_EVENT_PATH.') from None
-        payload = release_payload(event, env.get('GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT'))
-        if payload is None:
-            print('Skipped draft or prerelease; no message sent.')
-            return 0
-        message_id = DiscordWebhook(env.get('DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL')).send(payload)
-        print(f'Announcement verified by exact message readback: message_id={message_id}.')
-        return 0
-    except AnnouncementError as error:
-        print(f'Error: {error}', file=sys.stderr)
-        return 1
-
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-    sys.exit(main())

.github/discord-release/test_announce.py

@@ -1,427 +0,0 @@
-"""Offline contract tests; no Discord credentials or network required."""
-
-import contextlib
-import io
-import json
-import os
-from pathlib import Path
-import subprocess
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
-
-try:
-    import announce
-except ModuleNotFoundError:
-    announce = None
-
-WEBHOOK = 'https://discord.com/api/webhooks/123456789012345678/fixture_token-ONLY'
-WEBHOOK_ID = '123456789012345678'
-GUILD_ID = '234567890123456789'
-CHANNEL_ID = '345678901234567890'
-MESSAGE_ID = '456789012345678901'
-REPO = 'langbot-app/LangBot'
-URL = f'https://github.com/{REPO}/releases/tag/v4.10.11'
-CONTENT = f'@everyone LangBot v4.10.11 is now available!\nRelease notes: {URL}'
-
-
-def event():
-    return {
-        'action': 'published',
-        'repository': {'full_name': REPO},
-        'release': {
-            'draft': False,
-            'prerelease': False,
-            'tag_name': 'v4.10.11',
-            'html_url': URL,
-            'name': 'Hostile @everyone <@123> $(touch /tmp/unsafe)',
-            'body': '@everyone @here <@123> <@&456> `hostile`',
-        },
-    }
-
-
-def metadata():
-    return {'id': WEBHOOK_ID, 'type': 1, 'guild_id': GUILD_ID, 'channel_id': CHANNEL_ID}
-
-
-def message():
-    return {
-        'id': MESSAGE_ID,
-        'webhook_id': WEBHOOK_ID,
-        'channel_id': CHANNEL_ID,
-        'content': CONTENT,
-        'mention_everyone': True,
-        'mentions': [],
-        'mention_roles': [],
-    }
-
-
-class BaseTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.assertIsNotNone(announce, 'The release announcement helper must exist')
-
-
-class PolicyTests(BaseTest):
-    def test_payload_has_one_literal_everyone_and_no_untrusted_body(self):
-        payload = announce.release_payload(event(), '1')
-        self.assertEqual(payload['content'], CONTENT)
-        self.assertEqual(json.dumps(payload).count('@everyone'), 1)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            payload['allowed_mentions'],
-            {
-                'parse': ['everyone'],
-                'users': [],
-                'roles': [],
-                'replied_user': False,
-            },
-        )
-        self.assertIs(payload['tts'], False)
-        self.assertEqual(payload['flags'], 0)
-
-    def test_drafts_and_prereleases_are_skipped(self):
-        for flag in ('draft', 'prerelease'):
-            with self.subTest(flag=flag):
-                value = event()
-                value['release'][flag] = True
-                self.assertIsNone(announce.release_payload(value, '1'))
-
-    def test_only_published_action_is_accepted(self):
-        for action in ('edited', 'created', 'released', 'deleted', '', None):
-            with self.subTest(action=action):
-                value = event()
-                value['action'] = action
-                with self.assertRaises(announce.AnnouncementError):
-                    announce.release_payload(value, '1')
-
-    def test_reruns_and_missing_attempt_refuse_manual_reconciliation(self):
-        for attempt in ('2', '3', '', None, '01', '0', '1\n'):
-            with self.subTest(attempt=attempt):
-                with self.assertRaisesRegex(announce.AnnouncementError, 'manual reconciliation'):
-                    announce.release_payload(event(), attempt)
-
-    def test_repository_must_match_exactly(self):
-        for repo in ('evil/LangBot', 'langbot-app/langbot', None):
-            value = event()
-            value['repository']['full_name'] = repo
-            with self.assertRaises(announce.AnnouncementError):
-                announce.release_payload(value, '1')
-
-    def test_hostile_and_noncanonical_tags_are_rejected(self):
-        for tag in (
-            'v1.2.3 @everyone',
-            'v1.2.3\n',
-            'v1.2.3/../../x',
-            'v1.2.3?x=y',
-            '$(id)',
-            'v1.2.3-rc.1',
-            'v１.2.3',
-            'v1.2.3%0a',
-            '<@123>',
-            'v1.2.' + '3' * 100,
-            '',
-            None,
-            123,
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(tag=tag):
-                value = event()
-                value['release']['tag_name'] = tag
-                value['release']['html_url'] = f'https://github.com/{REPO}/releases/tag/{tag}'
-                with self.assertRaises(announce.AnnouncementError):
-                    announce.release_payload(value, '1')
-
-    def test_release_url_must_be_canonical_and_match_tag(self):
-        for url in (
-            'https://evil.example/tag/v4.10.11',
-            URL + '?x=y',
-            URL + '#anchor',
-            URL + '/',
-            URL.replace('v4.10.11', 'v4.10.12'),
-            URL.replace('github.com', 'github.com@evil.example'),
-            URL.replace('https:', 'http:'),
-            URL + '\n',
-            None,
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(url=url):
-                value = event()
-                value['release']['html_url'] = url
-                with self.assertRaises(announce.AnnouncementError):
-                    announce.release_payload(value, '1')
-
-    def test_malformed_events_fail_closed(self):
-        for value in (None, [], {}, {'release': []}, {'repository': None}):
-            with self.subTest(value=value):
-                with self.assertRaises(announce.AnnouncementError):
-                    announce.release_payload(value, '1')
-        for flag in ('draft', 'prerelease'):
-            for bad in (None, 'false', 0, 1):
-                value = event()
-                value['release'][flag] = bad
-                with self.assertRaises(announce.AnnouncementError):
-                    announce.release_payload(value, '1')
-
-
-class DiscordTests(BaseTest):
-    def setUp(self):
-        super().setUp()
-        self.patch = patch('announce.http.client.HTTPSConnection')
-        self.connection_class = self.patch.start()
-        self.addCleanup(self.patch.stop)
-        self.connection = self.connection_class.return_value
-
-    def respond(self, *values):
-        responses = []
-        for value in values:
-            response = MagicMock()
-            response.status = 200
-            response.read.return_value = json.dumps(value).encode()
-            responses.append(response)
-        self.connection.getresponse.side_effect = responses
-
-    def methods(self):
-        return [call.args[0] for call in self.connection.request.call_args_list]
-
-    def test_webhook_validation_is_get_only_and_reports_ids(self):
-        self.respond(metadata())
-        result = announce.DiscordWebhook(WEBHOOK).validate()
-        self.assertEqual(result, metadata())
-        self.assertEqual(self.methods(), ['GET'])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            self.connection.request.call_args.args[:2], ('GET', f'/api/webhooks/{WEBHOOK_ID}/fixture_token-ONLY')
-        )
-        self.connection_class.assert_called_with('discord.com', timeout=20)
-        self.connection.close.assert_called_once()
-
-    def test_invalid_webhook_urls_are_rejected_before_network(self):
-        for url in (
-            '',
-            None,
-            WEBHOOK + '/',
-            WEBHOOK + '?wait=true',
-            WEBHOOK + '#x',
-            WEBHOOK + '\n',
-            ' ' + WEBHOOK,
-            WEBHOOK.replace('https:', 'http:'),
-            WEBHOOK.replace('discord.com', 'discord.com.evil.example'),
-            WEBHOOK.replace('discord.com', 'discord.com@evil.example'),
-            WEBHOOK.replace('discord.com', 'discord.com:443'),
-            WEBHOOK.replace('/api/', '/api/v10/'),
-            WEBHOOK.replace(WEBHOOK_ID, 'abc'),
-            WEBHOOK + '/../../x',
-            WEBHOOK.replace('fixture_token-ONLY', 'a%2Fb'),
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(url=url):
-                with self.assertRaises(announce.AnnouncementError):
-                    announce.DiscordWebhook(url)
-        self.connection_class.assert_not_called()
-
-    def test_webhook_metadata_requires_incoming_type_and_ids(self):
-        invalid = [
-            None,
-            [],
-            {},
-            dict(metadata(), type=2),
-            dict(metadata(), type=True),
-            dict(metadata(), id='999'),
-            dict(metadata(), channel_id=None),
-            dict(metadata(), guild_id='::error::hostile'),
-        ]
-        for value in invalid:
-            with self.subTest(value=value):
-                self.respond(value)
-                with self.assertRaises(announce.AnnouncementError):
-                    announce.DiscordWebhook(WEBHOOK).validate()
-        self.assertNotIn('POST', self.methods())
-
-    def test_send_waits_and_reads_back_exact_returned_message(self):
-        self.respond(metadata(), message(), message())
-        result = announce.DiscordWebhook(WEBHOOK).send(announce.release_payload(event(), '1'))
-        self.assertEqual(result, MESSAGE_ID)
-        self.assertEqual(self.methods(), ['GET', 'POST', 'GET'])
-        calls = self.connection.request.call_args_list
-        self.assertEqual(calls[1].args[:2], ('POST', f'/api/webhooks/{WEBHOOK_ID}/fixture_token-ONLY?wait=true'))
-        self.assertEqual(json.loads(calls[1].kwargs['body']), announce.release_payload(event(), '1'))
-        self.assertEqual(
-            calls[2].args[:2], ('GET', f'/api/webhooks/{WEBHOOK_ID}/fixture_token-ONLY/messages/{MESSAGE_ID}')
-        )
-
-    def test_readback_must_match_content_mentions_and_identity(self):
-        for field, bad in (
-            ('content', 'wrong'),
-            ('mention_everyone', False),
-            ('mention_everyone', 1),
-            ('mentions', [{'id': '123'}]),
-            ('mention_roles', ['123']),
-            ('id', '999'),
-            ('channel_id', '999'),
-            ('webhook_id', '999'),
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(field=field, bad=bad):
-                self.connection.reset_mock()
-                self.respond(metadata(), message(), dict(message(), **{field: bad}))
-                with self.assertRaisesRegex(announce.AnnouncementError, 'manual reconciliation'):
-                    announce.DiscordWebhook(WEBHOOK).send(announce.release_payload(event(), '1'))
-                self.assertEqual(self.methods().count('POST'), 1)
-
-    def test_missing_readback_fields_fail_closed(self):
-        for field in message():
-            value = message()
-            del value[field]
-            self.respond(metadata(), message(), value)
-            with self.assertRaises(announce.AnnouncementError):
-                announce.DiscordWebhook(WEBHOOK).send(announce.release_payload(event(), '1'))
-
-    def test_unsafe_post_message_id_never_becomes_get_path(self):
-        for value in (None, {}, dict(message(), id='../evil'), dict(message(), id='123?x=y')):
-            self.connection.reset_mock()
-            self.respond(metadata(), value)
-            with self.assertRaisesRegex(announce.AnnouncementError, 'manual reconciliation'):
-                announce.DiscordWebhook(WEBHOOK).send(announce.release_payload(event(), '1'))
-            self.assertEqual(self.methods(), ['GET', 'POST'])
-
-    def test_post_failure_never_retries_and_never_logs_secret(self):
-        for status in (301, 302, 307, 308, 400, 401, 403, 429, 500, 204):
-            with self.subTest(status=status):
-                self.connection.reset_mock()
-                self.respond(metadata(), message())
-                responses = list(self.connection.getresponse.side_effect)
-                responses[1].status = status
-                self.connection.getresponse.side_effect = responses
-                with self.assertRaisesRegex(announce.AnnouncementError, 'manual reconciliation') as caught:
-                    announce.DiscordWebhook(WEBHOOK).send(announce.release_payload(event(), '1'))
-                self.assertNotIn('fixture_token', str(caught.exception))
-                self.assertEqual(self.methods(), ['GET', 'POST'])
-
-    def test_ambiguous_timeout_never_retries_or_echoes_exception(self):
-        self.respond(metadata())
-        first = next(self.connection.getresponse.side_effect)
-        self.connection.getresponse.side_effect = [first, TimeoutError(WEBHOOK)]
-        with self.assertRaisesRegex(announce.AnnouncementError, 'manual reconciliation') as caught:
-            announce.DiscordWebhook(WEBHOOK).send(announce.release_payload(event(), '1'))
-        self.assertNotIn('fixture_token', str(caught.exception))
-        self.assertEqual(self.methods(), ['GET', 'POST'])
-
-    def test_malformed_json_response_is_sanitized(self):
-        self.respond(metadata())
-        response = next(self.connection.getresponse.side_effect)
-        response.read.return_value = WEBHOOK.encode()
-        self.connection.getresponse.side_effect = [response]
-        with self.assertRaises(announce.AnnouncementError) as caught:
-            announce.DiscordWebhook(WEBHOOK).validate()
-        self.assertNotIn('fixture_token', str(caught.exception))
-
-    def test_get_redirect_is_not_followed(self):
-        self.respond(metadata())
-        response = next(self.connection.getresponse.side_effect)
-        response.status = 302
-        response.getheader.return_value = 'https://evil.example/'
-        self.connection.getresponse.side_effect = [response]
-        with self.assertRaises(announce.AnnouncementError):
-            announce.DiscordWebhook(WEBHOOK).validate()
-        self.assertEqual(self.methods(), ['GET'])
-
-
-class EntrypointTests(BaseTest):
-    def run_main(self, data=None, **overrides):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            path = Path(directory) / 'event.json'
-            path.write_text(json.dumps(event() if data is None else data))
-            env = {
-                'GITHUB_EVENT_NAME': 'release',
-                'GITHUB_EVENT_PATH': str(path),
-                'GITHUB_REPOSITORY': REPO,
-                'GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT': '1',
-                'DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL': WEBHOOK,
-            }
-            env.update(overrides)
-            output = io.StringIO()
-            with contextlib.redirect_stdout(output), contextlib.redirect_stderr(output):
-                result = announce.main(env)
-            return result, output.getvalue()
-
-    def test_dispatch_only_validates_even_if_event_contains_release(self):
-        with patch('announce.DiscordWebhook') as client:
-            client.return_value.validate.return_value = metadata()
-            result, output = self.run_main(GITHUB_EVENT_NAME='workflow_dispatch')
-        self.assertEqual(result, 0)
-        client.return_value.validate.assert_called_once()
-        client.return_value.send.assert_not_called()
-        self.assertIn(GUILD_ID, output)
-        self.assertIn(CHANNEL_ID, output)
-        self.assertNotIn('fixture_token', output)
-
-    def test_production_release_sends_once(self):
-        with patch('announce.DiscordWebhook') as client:
-            client.return_value.send.return_value = MESSAGE_ID
-            result, output = self.run_main()
-        self.assertEqual(result, 0)
-        client.return_value.send.assert_called_once_with(announce.release_payload(event(), '1'))
-        self.assertIn(MESSAGE_ID, output)
-
-    def test_skipped_releases_need_no_secret_or_network(self):
-        for flag in ('draft', 'prerelease'):
-            value = event()
-            value['release'][flag] = True
-            with patch('announce.DiscordWebhook') as client:
-                result, _ = self.run_main(value, DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL='')
-            self.assertEqual(result, 0)
-            client.assert_not_called()
-
-    def test_rerun_never_constructs_client(self):
-        with patch('announce.DiscordWebhook') as client:
-            result, output = self.run_main(GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT='2')
-        self.assertEqual(result, 1)
-        self.assertIn('manual reconciliation', output)
-        client.assert_not_called()
-
-    def test_unexpected_event_or_repository_cannot_send(self):
-        for overrides in (
-            {'GITHUB_EVENT_NAME': 'push'},
-            {'GITHUB_EVENT_NAME': 'pull_request'},
-            {'GITHUB_REPOSITORY': 'evil/LangBot'},
-        ):
-            with patch('announce.DiscordWebhook') as client:
-                result, _ = self.run_main(**overrides)
-            self.assertEqual(result, 1)
-            client.assert_not_called()
-
-    def test_missing_secret_fails_clearly_for_send_and_validation(self):
-        for name in ('release', 'workflow_dispatch'):
-            result, output = self.run_main(GITHUB_EVENT_NAME=name, DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL='')
-            self.assertEqual(result, 1)
-            self.assertIn('DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL is missing', output)
-
-    def test_cli_reads_event_file_and_redacts_invalid_input(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as directory:
-            path = Path(directory) / 'event.json'
-            value = event()
-            value['release']['tag_name'] = '::error::hostile @everyone'
-            path.write_text(json.dumps(value))
-            env = dict(
-                os.environ,
-                GITHUB_EVENT_NAME='release',
-                GITHUB_EVENT_PATH=str(path),
-                GITHUB_REPOSITORY=REPO,
-                GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT='1',
-                DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL=WEBHOOK,
-            )
-            result = subprocess.run(
-                [sys.executable, str(Path(__file__).with_name('announce.py'))],
-                env=env,
-                text=True,
-                capture_output=True,
-                check=False,
-            )
-        self.assertEqual(result.returncode, 1)
-        self.assertNotIn('hostile', result.stderr)
-        self.assertNotIn('fixture_token', result.stderr)
-        self.assertNotIn('Traceback', result.stderr)
-
-    def test_unreadable_event_fails_safely(self):
-        result, output = self.run_main(GITHUB_EVENT_PATH='/nonexistent/event.json')
-        self.assertEqual(result, 1)
-        self.assertNotIn('Traceback', output)
-
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-    unittest.main()

.github/workflows/discord-release.yml

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-name: Discord Release Announcement
-
-on:
-  release:
-    types: [published]
-  workflow_dispatch:
-  push:
-    paths:
-      - '.github/workflows/discord-release.yml'
-      - '.github/discord-release/**'
-  pull_request:
-    paths:
-      - '.github/workflows/discord-release.yml'
-      - '.github/discord-release/**'
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-
-jobs:
-  tests:
-    name: Offline announcement tests
-    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
-    timeout-minutes: 5
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-      - name: Test helper without secrets or network
-        run: python3 -m unittest discover -s .github/discord-release -p 'test_*.py' -v
-
-  validate:
-    name: Validate webhook (GET only, no message)
-    if: github.repository == 'langbot-app/LangBot' && github.event_name == 'workflow_dispatch'
-    needs: tests
-    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
-    timeout-minutes: 5
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-      - name: Validate incoming webhook and report guild/channel IDs
-        env:
-          DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL: ${{ secrets.DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL }}
-        run: python3 .github/discord-release/announce.py
-
-  announce:
-    name: Announce published stable release
-    if: >-
-      github.repository == 'langbot-app/LangBot' &&
-      github.event_name == 'release' && github.event.action == 'published' &&
-      github.event.release.draft == false && github.event.release.prerelease == false
-    needs: tests
-    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
-    timeout-minutes: 5
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # v4
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-      # The helper refuses GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT != 1 with recovery guidance.
-      # Never interpolate release data into a shell command.
-      - name: Send once and verify the exact Discord message
-        env:
-          DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL: ${{ secrets.DISCORD_RELEASE_WEBHOOK_URL }}
-        run: python3 .github/discord-release/announce.py

src/langbot/pkg/api/http/controller/groups/user.py

@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+"""Account, authentication, passkey and TOTP HTTP routes.
+
+Exposes the unauthenticated login/recovery surface as well as the authenticated
+account-management, passkey (WebAuthn) and TOTP second-factor endpoints under
+``/api/v1/user``.
+"""
+
 from __future__ import annotations
 
 import quart
@@ -15,6 +22,7 @@ from .....entity.errors import account as account_errors
 from ...context import RequestContext
 from .....cloud.launch import SpaceLaunchError
 from ...service.user import ControlPlaneDirectoryRequiredError, PublicRegistrationClosedError
+from ...service.totp import TotpAlreadyEnabledError, TotpInvalidCodeError, TotpNotEnabledError
 
 # Fixed-window admission quota for the unauthenticated reset-password endpoint (#2392).
 # The admission check and slot bump share ONE synchronous critical section with no await
@@ -46,7 +54,10 @@ def _admit_reset_attempt(now: float) -> bool:
 
 @group.group_class('user', '/api/v1/user')
 class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
+    """``/api/v1/user`` routes for accounts, auth, passkeys and TOTP."""
+
     def _validate_space_redirect_uri(self, redirect_uri: str, *, bind: bool) -> str:
+        """Validate a Space OAuth redirect URI against the expected callback shape."""
         parsed = urlsplit(redirect_uri)
         if (
             parsed.scheme not in {'http', 'https'}
@@ -67,7 +78,11 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
 
         return redirect_uri
 
-    def _extract_origin_and_rp_id(self, json_data: dict[str, typing.Any] | None = None) -> tuple[str, str]:
+    def _extract_origin_and_rp_id(
+        self,
+        json_data: dict[str, typing.Any] | None = None,
+    ) -> tuple[str, str]:
+        """Resolve the WebAuthn origin and relying-party ID for a request."""
         origin = ''
         if json_data and isinstance(json_data, dict):
             origin = json_data.get('origin', '')
@@ -80,14 +95,21 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
 
         parsed = urlsplit(origin)
         rp_id = parsed.hostname or 'localhost'
-        clean_origin = f'{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}' if parsed.scheme and parsed.netloc else origin.rstrip('/')
+        if parsed.scheme and parsed.netloc:
+            clean_origin = f'{parsed.scheme}://{parsed.netloc}'
+        else:
+            clean_origin = origin.rstrip('/')
         return clean_origin, rp_id
 
     async def initialize(self) -> None:
+        """Register every ``/api/v1/user`` route on this router group."""
+
         @self.route('/init', methods=['GET', 'POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.NONE)
         async def _() -> str:
+            """Report initialization state, or create the first account (POST)."""
             if quart.request.method == 'GET':
-                return self.success(data={'initialized': await self.ap.user_service.is_initialized()})
+                initialized = await self.ap.user_service.is_initialized()
+                return self.success(data={'initialized': initialized})
 
             if await self.ap.user_service.is_initialized():
                 return self.fail(1, 'System already initialized')
@@ -108,27 +130,56 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
 
         @self.route('/auth', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.NONE)
         async def _() -> str:
-            if getattr(getattr(self.ap, 'deployment', None), 'mode', 'oss') == 'cloud':
-                return self.http_status(403, 'password_login_disabled', 'Password login is disabled on LangBot Cloud')
+            """Authenticate a local Account, requiring a TOTP factor when enabled."""
+            deployment = getattr(self.ap, 'deployment', None)
+            if getattr(deployment, 'mode', 'oss') == 'cloud':
+                return self.http_status(
+                    403,
+                    'password_login_disabled',
+                    'Password login is disabled on LangBot Cloud',
+                )
             json_data = await quart.request.json
 
+            user_email = json_data['user']
             try:
-                token = await self.ap.user_service.authenticate(json_data['user'], json_data['password'])
+                token = await self.ap.user_service.authenticate(user_email, json_data['password'])
             except argon2.exceptions.VerifyMismatchError:
                 return self.fail(1, 'Invalid username or password')
             except ValueError as e:
                 return self.fail(1, str(e))
 
+            # Second factor: an enabled TOTP credential makes the password alone
+            # insufficient. The client retries the same request with a code.
+            user_obj = await self.ap.user_service.get_user_by_email(user_email)
+            if user_obj is not None and await self.ap.totp_service.is_enabled(user_obj.uuid):
+                totp_code = json_data.get('totp_code')
+                recovery_code = json_data.get('recovery_code')
+                verified = False
+                if totp_code:
+                    verified = await self.ap.totp_service.verify_for_account(
+                        user_obj.uuid,
+                        str(totp_code),
+                    )
+                elif recovery_code:
+                    verified = await self.ap.totp_service.redeem_recovery_code(
+                        user_obj.uuid,
+                        str(recovery_code),
+                    )
+                if not verified:
+                    return self.http_status(401, 'totp_required', 'TOTP verification required')
+
             return self.success(data={'token': token})
 
         @self.route('/check-token', methods=['GET'], auth_type=group.AuthType.ACCOUNT_TOKEN)
         async def _(account) -> str:
+            """Issue a fresh user token for an already-authenticated Account."""
             token = await self.ap.user_service.generate_jwt_token(account)
 
             return self.success(data={'token': token})
 
         @self.route('/reset-password', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.NONE)
         async def _() -> str:
+            """Reset a password using the recovery key, TOTP, or a recovery code."""
             # Admit (or reject) BEFORE touching the body or any service call (#2392):
             # rejecting requests never reach the slow path, and quota accounting happens
             # synchronously at entry, closing the post-await race of burst requests.
@@ -138,7 +189,11 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
             json_data = await quart.request.json
 
             user_email = json_data['user']
-            recovery_key = json_data['recovery_key']
+            # Recovery accepts either the instance recovery key, or (for accounts
+            # that enrolled one) a TOTP code or a one-time TOTP recovery code.
+            recovery_key = json_data.get('recovery_key')
+            totp_code = json_data.get('totp_code')
+            recovery_code = json_data.get('recovery_code')
             new_password = json_data['new_password']
 
             # hard sleep 3s for security
@@ -152,19 +207,39 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
             if user_obj is None:
                 return self.http_status(400, -1, 'User not found')
 
-            stored_key = self.ap.instance_config.data['system']['recovery_key']
-            try:
-                key_matches = (
-                    isinstance(recovery_key, str)
-                    and isinstance(stored_key, str)
-                    and hmac.compare_digest(recovery_key.encode(), stored_key.encode())
-                )
-            except UnicodeEncodeError:
-                # JSON can contain lone surrogates, which are not valid UTF-8.
-                key_matches = False
+            if totp_code or recovery_code:
+                if not await self.ap.totp_service.is_enabled(user_obj.uuid):
+                    return self.http_status(
+                        403,
+                        'totp_not_enabled',
+                        'TOTP is not enabled for this account',
+                    )
+                if totp_code:
+                    authorized = await self.ap.totp_service.verify_for_account(
+                        user_obj.uuid,
+                        str(totp_code),
+                    )
+                else:
+                    authorized = await self.ap.totp_service.redeem_recovery_code(
+                        user_obj.uuid,
+                        str(recovery_code),
+                    )
+                if not authorized:
+                    return self.http_status(403, 'totp_invalid_code', 'Invalid TOTP code')
+            else:
+                stored_key = self.ap.instance_config.data['system']['recovery_key']
+                try:
+                    key_matches = (
+                        isinstance(recovery_key, str)
+                        and isinstance(stored_key, str)
+                        and hmac.compare_digest(recovery_key.encode(), stored_key.encode())
+                    )
+                except UnicodeEncodeError:
+                    # JSON can contain lone surrogates, which are not valid UTF-8.
+                    key_matches = False
 
-            if not key_matches:
-                return self.http_status(403, -1, 'Invalid recovery key')
+                if not key_matches:
+                    return self.http_status(403, -1, 'Invalid recovery key')
 
             await self.ap.user_service.reset_password(user_email, new_password)
 
@@ -172,6 +247,7 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
 
         @self.route('/change-password', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
         async def _(user_email: str) -> str:
+            """Change the current Account password after verifying the old one."""
             # Check if password change is allowed
             allow_modify_login_info = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('system', {}).get(
                 'allow_modify_login_info', True
@@ -185,7 +261,11 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
             new_password = json_data['new_password']
 
             try:
-                await self.ap.user_service.change_password(user_email, current_password, new_password)
+                await self.ap.user_service.change_password(
+                    user_email,
+                    current_password,
+                    new_password,
+                )
             except argon2.exceptions.VerifyMismatchError:
                 return self.http_status(400, -1, 'Current password is incorrect')
             except ValueError as e:
@@ -209,7 +289,8 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
                 redirect_uri = self._validate_space_redirect_uri(redirect_uri, bind=False)
                 launch_workspace_uuid = quart.request.args.get('launch_workspace_uuid')
                 if launch_workspace_uuid:
-                    if not getattr(getattr(self.ap, 'deployment', None), 'multi_workspace_enabled', False):
+                    deployment = getattr(self.ap, 'deployment', None)
+                    if not getattr(deployment, 'multi_workspace_enabled', False):
                         return self.fail(1, 'Space launch requires Cloud mode')
                     try:
                         uuid.UUID(launch_workspace_uuid)
@@ -226,7 +307,11 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
             except ValueError as e:
                 return self.fail(1, str(e))
 
-        @self.route('/space/bind-authorize-url', methods=['GET'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
+        @self.route(
+            '/space/bind-authorize-url',
+            methods=['GET'],
+            auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN,
+        )
         async def _(request_context: RequestContext) -> str:
             """Issue an account-bound, one-time Space OAuth redirect."""
             redirect_uri = quart.request.args.get('redirect_uri', '')
@@ -272,19 +357,24 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
 
             try:
                 redirect_uri = self._validate_space_redirect_uri(str(redirect_uri), bind=False)
-                consumed_state = await self.ap.user_service.consume_space_oauth_state_details(state, 'login')
+                consumed_state = await self.ap.user_service.consume_space_oauth_state_details(
+                    state,
+                    'login',
+                )
                 # Exchange code for tokens
                 launch_workspace_uuid = consumed_state.launch_workspace_uuid
                 workspace_uuids = [launch_workspace_uuid] if launch_workspace_uuid else []
                 workspace_created_ats: dict[str, int] = {}
-                if not workspace_uuids and getattr(getattr(self.ap, 'deployment', None), 'mode', 'oss') != 'cloud':
+                deployment = getattr(self.ap, 'deployment', None)
+                if not workspace_uuids and getattr(deployment, 'mode', 'oss') != 'cloud':
                     binding = await self.ap.workspace_service.get_execution_binding()
                     workspace_uuids = [binding.workspace_uuid]
                     workspace_created_at = binding.workspace_created_at
                     if workspace_created_at is not None:
                         if workspace_created_at.tzinfo is None:
                             workspace_created_at = workspace_created_at.replace(tzinfo=datetime.UTC)
-                        workspace_created_ats[binding.workspace_uuid] = int(workspace_created_at.timestamp())
+                        created_at_epoch = int(workspace_created_at.timestamp())
+                        workspace_created_ats[binding.workspace_uuid] = created_at_epoch
                 token_data = await self.ap.space_service.exchange_oauth_code(
                     code,
                     workspace_uuids,
@@ -299,14 +389,20 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
                 if not access_token:
                     return self.fail(1, 'Failed to get access token from Space')
 
-                cloud_mode = getattr(getattr(self.ap, 'deployment', None), 'mode', 'oss') == 'cloud'
-                if cloud_mode and launch_workspace_uuid and launch_workspace_uuid != cloud_workspace_uuid:
+                deployment = getattr(self.ap, 'deployment', None)
+                cloud_mode = getattr(deployment, 'mode', 'oss') == 'cloud'
+                launch_mismatch = launch_workspace_uuid != cloud_workspace_uuid
+                if cloud_mode and launch_workspace_uuid and launch_mismatch:
                     return self.fail(1, 'Space OAuth Workspace binding mismatch')
                 target_workspace_uuid = launch_workspace_uuid or cloud_workspace_uuid
                 if cloud_mode:
                     if not target_workspace_uuid:
-                        return self.fail(1, 'Space OAuth response is missing the Cloud Workspace binding')
-                    await self.ap.directory_projection_service.reconcile_workspaces((target_workspace_uuid,))
+                        return self.fail(
+                            1,
+                            'Space OAuth response is missing the Cloud Workspace binding',
+                        )
+                    projection_service = self.ap.directory_projection_service
+                    await projection_service.reconcile_workspaces((target_workspace_uuid,))
 
                 # Authenticate only after the signed, exact Workspace delta has
                 # established the Account and membership runtime shadow rows.
@@ -316,12 +412,15 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
 
                 if target_workspace_uuid:
                     try:
-                        access = await self.ap.workspace_collaboration_service.resolve_account_workspace(
+                        collab_service = self.ap.workspace_collaboration_service
+                        access = await collab_service.resolve_account_workspace(
                             user_obj.uuid,
                             target_workspace_uuid,
                         )
                     except Exception:
-                        self.ap.logger.warning('Rejected Space OAuth launch for unauthorized Workspace')
+                        self.ap.logger.warning(
+                            'Rejected Space OAuth launch for unauthorized Workspace',
+                        )
                         return self.fail(1, 'Space OAuth failed')
                     return self.success(
                         data={
@@ -356,6 +455,7 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
                     'user': account.user,
                     'account_type': account.account_type,
                     'has_password': bool(account.password and account.password.strip()),
+                    'totp_enabled': await self.ap.totp_service.is_enabled(account.uuid),
                 }
             )
 
@@ -408,6 +508,7 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
             capabilities['invitation_registration_enabled'] = not cloud_mode
             capabilities['passkey_login_enabled'] = True
             capabilities['passkey_supported'] = True
+            capabilities['totp_supported'] = True
             return self.success(data={'initialized': True, **capabilities})
 
         @self.route('/set-password', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
@@ -498,7 +599,11 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
             except Exception:
                 raise
 
-        @self.route('/passkey/register/options', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
+        @self.route(
+            '/passkey/register/options',
+            methods=['POST'],
+            auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN,
+        )
         async def _(user_email: str) -> str:
             """Generate WebAuthn registration options for current account."""
             allow_modify_login_info = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('system', {}).get(
@@ -515,7 +620,9 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
             origin, rp_id = self._extract_origin_and_rp_id(json_data)
 
             try:
-                options, challenge_token = await self.ap.user_service.generate_passkey_registration_options(
+                user_service = self.ap.user_service
+                reg_options = user_service.generate_passkey_registration_options
+                options, challenge_token = await reg_options(
                     account_uuid=user_obj.uuid,
                     rp_id=rp_id,
                     origin=origin,
@@ -525,7 +632,11 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
             except Exception as e:
                 return self.fail(1, str(e))
 
-        @self.route('/passkey/register/verify', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
+        @self.route(
+            '/passkey/register/verify',
+            methods=['POST'],
+            auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN,
+        )
         async def _(user_email: str) -> str:
             """Verify WebAuthn registration response and save credential."""
             allow_modify_login_info = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('system', {}).get(
@@ -570,7 +681,9 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
             origin, rp_id = self._extract_origin_and_rp_id(json_data)
 
             try:
-                options, challenge_token = await self.ap.user_service.generate_passkey_authentication_options(
+                user_service = self.ap.user_service
+                auth_options = user_service.generate_passkey_authentication_options
+                options, challenge_token = await auth_options(
                     rp_id=rp_id,
                     origin=origin,
                     email=email,
@@ -626,7 +739,11 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
                 ]
             )
 
-        @self.route('/passkey/<passkey_uuid>', methods=['PATCH'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
+        @self.route(
+            '/passkey/<passkey_uuid>',
+            methods=['PATCH'],
+            auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN,
+        )
         async def _(user_email: str, passkey_uuid: str) -> str:
             """Rename a registered passkey."""
             allow_modify_login_info = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('system', {}).get(
@@ -653,7 +770,11 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
                 return self.http_status(404, -1, 'Passkey not found')
             return self.success(data={'uuid': updated.uuid, 'name': updated.name})
 
-        @self.route('/passkey/<passkey_uuid>', methods=['DELETE'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
+        @self.route(
+            '/passkey/<passkey_uuid>',
+            methods=['DELETE'],
+            auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN,
+        )
         async def _(user_email: str, passkey_uuid: str) -> str:
             """Delete/revoke a registered passkey."""
             allow_modify_login_info = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('system', {}).get(
@@ -674,6 +795,160 @@ class UserRouterGroup(group.RouterGroup):
                 return self.http_status(404, -1, 'Passkey not found')
             return self.success()
 
+        @self.route('/totp/check', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.NONE)
+        async def _() -> str:
+            """Report whether TOTP is enabled for a given Account (unauthenticated).
+
+            Used by the password-recovery page to decide whether the TOTP and
+            recovery-code verification methods are selectable. Only the boolean
+            capability is disclosed; no account details leak.
+            """
+            if not await self.ap.user_service.is_initialized():
+                return self.http_status(400, -1, 'System not initialized')
+
+            json_data = await quart.request.json
+            user_email = json_data.get('user')
+            if not isinstance(user_email, str) or not user_email:
+                return self.fail(1, 'User is required')
+
+            user_obj = await self.ap.user_service.get_user_by_email(user_email)
+            enabled = user_obj is not None and await self.ap.totp_service.is_enabled(user_obj.uuid)
+
+            return self.success(data={'totp_enabled': enabled})
+
+        @self.route('/totp/status', methods=['GET'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
+        async def _(user_email: str) -> str:
+            """Report whether the current Account has TOTP enabled."""
+            user_obj = await self.ap.user_service.get_user_by_email(user_email)
+            if user_obj is None:
+                return self.http_status(404, -1, 'User not found')
+
+            return self.success(
+                data={
+                    'enabled': await self.ap.totp_service.is_enabled(user_obj.uuid),
+                    'remaining_recovery_codes': await self.ap.totp_service.remaining_recovery_codes(
+                        user_obj.uuid,
+                    ),
+                }
+            )
+
+        @self.route('/totp/enroll', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
+        async def _(user_email: str) -> str:
+            """Start TOTP enrolment and return the QR payload plus recovery codes.
+
+            The secret is not enforced until ``/totp/enroll/verify`` confirms the
+            authenticator app can produce a valid code.
+            """
+            allow_modify_login_info = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('system', {}).get(
+                'allow_modify_login_info', True
+            )
+            if not allow_modify_login_info:
+                return self.http_status(403, -1, 'Modifying login info is disabled')
+
+            user_obj = await self.ap.user_service.get_user_by_email(user_email)
+            if user_obj is None:
+                return self.http_status(404, -1, 'User not found')
+
+            try:
+                enrollment, recovery_codes = await self.ap.totp_service.begin_enrollment(user_obj)
+            except TotpAlreadyEnabledError as e:
+                return self.http_status(409, e.code, str(e))
+
+            return self.success(
+                data={
+                    'secret': enrollment.secret,
+                    'otpauth_uri': enrollment.otpauth_uri,
+                    'qr_svg': self.ap.totp_service.build_qr_svg(enrollment.otpauth_uri),
+                    'recovery_codes': recovery_codes,
+                }
+            )
+
+        @self.route('/totp/enroll/verify', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
+        async def _(user_email: str) -> str:
+            """Confirm enrolment with the first code from the authenticator app."""
+            allow_modify_login_info = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('system', {}).get(
+                'allow_modify_login_info', True
+            )
+            if not allow_modify_login_info:
+                return self.http_status(403, -1, 'Modifying login info is disabled')
+
+            user_obj = await self.ap.user_service.get_user_by_email(user_email)
+            if user_obj is None:
+                return self.http_status(404, -1, 'User not found')
+
+            json_data = await quart.request.json
+            code = json_data.get('code')
+            if not code:
+                return self.fail(1, 'Verification code is required')
+
+            try:
+                await self.ap.totp_service.confirm_enrollment(user_obj.uuid, str(code))
+            except TotpNotEnabledError as e:
+                return self.http_status(400, e.code, str(e))
+            except TotpAlreadyEnabledError as e:
+                return self.http_status(409, e.code, str(e))
+            except TotpInvalidCodeError as e:
+                return self.http_status(400, e.code, str(e))
+
+            return self.success(data={'enabled': True})
+
+        @self.route('/totp/recovery-codes', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
+        async def _(user_email: str) -> str:
+            """Regenerate one-time recovery codes after proving a valid TOTP code."""
+            allow_modify_login_info = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('system', {}).get(
+                'allow_modify_login_info', True
+            )
+            if not allow_modify_login_info:
+                return self.http_status(403, -1, 'Modifying login info is disabled')
+
+            user_obj = await self.ap.user_service.get_user_by_email(user_email)
+            if user_obj is None:
+                return self.http_status(404, -1, 'User not found')
+
+            json_data = await quart.request.json
+            code = json_data.get('code')
+            if not code:
+                return self.fail(1, 'Verification code is required')
+
+            if not await self.ap.totp_service.verify_for_account(user_obj.uuid, str(code)):
+                return self.http_status(400, TotpInvalidCodeError.code, 'Invalid verification code')
+
+            try:
+                _, recovery_codes = await self.ap.totp_service.regenerate_recovery_codes(
+                    user_obj.uuid,
+                )
+            except TotpNotEnabledError as e:
+                return self.http_status(400, e.code, str(e))
+
+            return self.success(data={'recovery_codes': recovery_codes})
+
+        @self.route('/totp/disable', methods=['POST'], auth_type=group.AuthType.USER_TOKEN)
+        async def _(user_email: str) -> str:
+            """Disable TOTP for the current Account after a valid code check."""
+            allow_modify_login_info = self.ap.instance_config.data.get('system', {}).get(
+                'allow_modify_login_info', True
+            )
+            if not allow_modify_login_info:
+                return self.http_status(403, -1, 'Modifying login info is disabled')
+
+            user_obj = await self.ap.user_service.get_user_by_email(user_email)
+            if user_obj is None:
+                return self.http_status(404, -1, 'User not found')
+
+            json_data = await quart.request.json
+            code = json_data.get('code')
+            if not code:
+                return self.fail(1, 'Verification code is required')
+
+            try:
+                await self.ap.totp_service.disable(user_obj.uuid, str(code))
+            except TotpNotEnabledError as e:
+                return self.http_status(400, e.code, str(e))
+            except TotpInvalidCodeError as e:
+                return self.http_status(400, e.code, str(e))
+
+            return self.success(data={'enabled': False})
+
     async def _handle_space_direct_launch(
         self,
         launch_assertion: str,

src/langbot/pkg/api/http/service/totp.py

@@ -0,0 +1,478 @@
+"""Second-factor TOTP (RFC 6238) enrolment, verification and recovery.
+
+This service backs the optional TOTP second factor for LangBot Accounts:
+
+* the shared secret is encrypted at rest with a Fernet key derived from the
+  instance JWT secret via HKDF, and is never persisted in plaintext;
+* recovery codes are stored only as salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 digests;
+* the plaintext secret and recovery codes leave the server exactly once, in the
+  enrolment response.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import base64
+import dataclasses
+import datetime
+import hashlib
+import hmac
+import json
+import logging
+import secrets
+import struct
+import time
+import typing
+import uuid
+
+import sqlalchemy
+from sqlalchemy.ext.asyncio import AsyncSession, async_sessionmaker
+
+from ....entity.persistence import totp
+from ....entity.persistence import user
+
+if typing.TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from ....core.app import Application
+
+_logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+# RFC 6238 parameters. Six digits and a 30 second step are what every common
+# authenticator app (Google Authenticator, Authy, 1Password, ...) defaults to.
+_TOTP_DIGITS = 6
+_TOTP_STEP_SECONDS = 30
+# Accept one step of clock skew in either direction, which tolerates small
+# device clock drift without materially widening the brute-force window.
+_TOTP_WINDOW_STEPS = 1
+_RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT = 10
+# 10 groups drawn from 32 symbols provide 50 bits of entropy per recovery code.
+_RECOVERY_CODE_ALPHABET = '23456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZ'
+_RECOVERY_CODE_LENGTH = 10
+# Recovery codes are stored only as salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 digests. The work
+# factor is intentionally high: guessing is already infeasible against 50 bits of
+# entropy, and the slow KDF keeps a dumped database from being attacked cheaply.
+# Hashing runs off the event loop, so this is a latency cost paid only at
+# enrolment / regeneration / redemption.
+_RECOVERY_CODE_KDF_ITERATIONS = 300_000
+
+
+class TotpAlreadyEnabledError(ValueError):
+    """Raised when enrolling an Account that already has TOTP enabled."""
+
+    code = 'totp_already_enabled'
+
+
+class TotpNotEnabledError(ValueError):
+    """Raised when an operation requires an enabled TOTP credential."""
+
+    code = 'totp_not_enabled'
+
+
+class TotpInvalidCodeError(ValueError):
+    """Raised when a supplied TOTP or recovery code fails verification."""
+
+    code = 'totp_invalid_code'
+
+
+@dataclasses.dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
+class TotpEnrollment:
+    """Result of starting (or restarting) TOTP enrolment for an Account."""
+
+    secret: str
+    otpauth_uri: str
+
+
+class TotpService:
+    """Second-factor TOTP enrolment, verification and recovery for Accounts.
+
+    Nothing usable is persisted in plaintext:
+
+    * The shared TOTP secret is encrypted at rest with a Fernet key derived from
+      the instance JWT secret via HKDF, so a leaked database file alone does not
+      expose live secrets (the attacker additionally needs ``config.yaml``).
+    * Recovery codes are stored only as salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 digests and are
+      consumed one at a time.
+    * The plaintext secret / recovery codes leave the server exactly once, in the
+      enrolment response, and are never stored or logged server-side.
+    """
+
+    ap: Application
+
+    def __init__(self, ap: Application) -> None:
+        self.ap = ap
+
+    # -- storage helpers -------------------------------------------------
+
+    def _session_factory(self) -> async_sessionmaker[AsyncSession]:
+        return async_sessionmaker(self.ap.persistence_mgr.get_db_engine(), expire_on_commit=False)
+
+    def _encryption_key(self) -> bytes:
+        """Derive a stable 32-byte Fernet key from the instance JWT secret.
+
+        HKDF-SHA256 with a fixed domain-separation salt keeps the key stable
+        across restarts and distinct from the JWT signing secret. The key
+        material is NOT stored in the database, so a leaked ``langbot.db`` alone
+        cannot decrypt the TOTP secrets.
+        """
+        secret = ''
+        try:
+            secret = self.ap.instance_config.data['system']['jwt']['secret'] or ''
+        except (KeyError, TypeError):
+            secret = ''
+        if not secret:
+            # Defence in depth: a missing JWT secret must not silently produce a
+            # well-known encryption key. This should never happen because
+            # GenKeysStage seeds it, but failing closed is safer than encrypting
+            # with a predictable key. The caller maps this to an invalid-code
+            # failure, so no plaintext is ever persisted.
+            raise TotpInvalidCodeError('Instance JWT secret unavailable')
+
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
+        from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
+
+        # HKDF enforces the label internally, so include it as `info`.
+        derived = HKDF(
+            algorithm=hashes.SHA256(),
+            length=32,
+            salt=b'langbot-totp-v1',
+            info=b'langbot-totp-secret-encryption',
+        ).derive(secret.encode('utf-8'))
+        return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(derived)
+
+    def _encrypt_secret(self, secret: str) -> str:
+        from cryptography.fernet import Fernet
+
+        return Fernet(self._encryption_key()).encrypt(secret.encode('utf-8')).decode('ascii')
+
+    def _decrypt_secret(self, token: str) -> str:
+        from cryptography.fernet import Fernet, InvalidToken
+
+        try:
+            return Fernet(self._encryption_key()).decrypt(token.encode('ascii')).decode('utf-8')
+        except (InvalidToken, ValueError) as exc:
+            raise TotpInvalidCodeError('Stored TOTP secret cannot be decrypted') from exc
+
+    # -- RFC 6238 primitives ---------------------------------------------
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def generate_secret() -> str:
+        """Return a fresh base32 secret (160 bits, the RFC 4226 recommendation)."""
+        return base64.b32encode(secrets.token_bytes(20)).decode('ascii').rstrip('=')
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _hotp(secret: str, counter: int) -> str:
+        padding = '=' * (-len(secret) % 8)
+        key = base64.b32decode(secret.upper() + padding)
+        msg = struct.pack('>Q', counter)
+        digest = hmac.new(key, msg, hashlib.sha1).digest()
+        offset = digest[-1] & 0x0F
+        binary = struct.unpack('>I', digest[offset : offset + 4])[0] & 0x7FFFFFFF
+        return str(binary % (10**_TOTP_DIGITS)).zfill(_TOTP_DIGITS)
+
+    @classmethod
+    def generate_code(cls, secret: str, at: float | None = None) -> str:
+        """Return the TOTP code for ``secret`` at the given (or current) time."""
+        counter = int((at if at is not None else time.time()) // _TOTP_STEP_SECONDS)
+        return cls._hotp(secret, counter)
+
+    @classmethod
+    def verify_code(cls, secret: str, code: str, at: float | None = None) -> bool:
+        """Constant-time check of a user-supplied code within the skew window."""
+        candidate = (code or '').strip().replace(' ', '')
+        if not candidate.isdigit() or len(candidate) != _TOTP_DIGITS:
+            return False
+        now = at if at is not None else time.time()
+        counter = int(now // _TOTP_STEP_SECONDS)
+        for offset in range(-_TOTP_WINDOW_STEPS, _TOTP_WINDOW_STEPS + 1):
+            expected = cls._hotp(secret, counter + offset)
+            if hmac.compare_digest(expected, candidate):
+                return True
+        return False
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def build_otpauth_uri(secret: str, account_name: str, issuer: str = 'LangBot') -> str:
+        """Build the otpauth:// URI an authenticator app scans from the QR code."""
+        from urllib.parse import quote, urlencode
+
+        label = quote(f'{issuer}:{account_name}')
+        params = urlencode(
+            {
+                'secret': secret,
+                'issuer': issuer,
+                'algorithm': 'SHA1',
+                'digits': _TOTP_DIGITS,
+                'period': _TOTP_STEP_SECONDS,
+            }
+        )
+        return f'otpauth://totp/{label}?{params}'
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def build_qr_svg(otpauth_uri: str) -> str:
+        """Render the otpauth URI to an inline SVG QR code.
+
+        SVG keeps the response text-only so the frontend can drop it straight
+        into a dialog without byte-encoding a PNG data URL.
+        """
+        import qrcode
+        import qrcode.image.svg
+
+        qr = qrcode.QRCode(
+            version=None,
+            error_correction=qrcode.constants.ERROR_CORRECT_M,
+            box_size=10,
+            border=2,
+            image_factory=qrcode.image.svg.SvgPathImage,
+        )
+        qr.add_data(otpauth_uri)
+        qr.make(fit=True)
+        image = qr.make_image()
+        import io
+
+        buffer = io.BytesIO()
+        image.save(buffer)
+        return buffer.getvalue().decode('utf-8')
+
+    # -- recovery codes ---------------------------------------------------
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _normalise_recovery_code(code: str) -> str:
+        return (code or '').strip().upper().replace('-', '').replace(' ', '')
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _hash_recovery_code(cls, code: str, *, salt: bytes | None = None) -> str:
+        """Return a self-describing PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 digest of a recovery code.
+
+        The format is ``pbkdf2_sha256$<iterations>$<salt_hex>$<digest_hex>`` so the
+        work factor is stored alongside the digest and can be raised later
+        without invalidating existing codes. Salted and slow, so a database dump
+        does not allow offline brute-forcing of recovery codes.
+        """
+        if salt is None:
+            salt = secrets.token_bytes(16)
+        digest = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac(
+            'sha256',
+            cls._normalise_recovery_code(code).encode('utf-8'),
+            salt,
+            _RECOVERY_CODE_KDF_ITERATIONS,
+        )
+        return f'pbkdf2_sha256${_RECOVERY_CODE_KDF_ITERATIONS}${salt.hex()}${digest.hex()}'
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _split_recovery_digest(stored: str) -> tuple[int, bytes, bytes] | None:
+        parts = (stored or '').split('$')
+        if len(parts) != 4 or parts[0] != 'pbkdf2_sha256':
+            return None
+        try:
+            iterations = int(parts[1])
+            salt = bytes.fromhex(parts[2])
+            digest = bytes.fromhex(parts[3])
+        except ValueError:
+            return None
+        return iterations, salt, digest
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _random_recovery_code() -> str:
+        """Return one random recovery code from the unambiguous alphabet."""
+        alphabet = _RECOVERY_CODE_ALPHABET
+        return ''.join(secrets.choice(alphabet) for _ in range(_RECOVERY_CODE_LENGTH))
+
+    @classmethod
+    async def generate_recovery_codes(cls) -> tuple[list[str], list[str]]:
+        """Return ``(plaintext_codes, hashed_codes)`` for one enrolment."""
+        plaintext: list[str] = []
+        hashed: list[str] = []
+        for _ in range(_RECOVERY_CODE_COUNT):
+            code = cls._random_recovery_code()
+            plaintext.append(code)
+            # Offload the expensive KDF so 10 codes do not stall the event loop.
+            hashed.append(await asyncio.to_thread(cls._hash_recovery_code, code))
+        return plaintext, hashed
+
+    # -- persistence ------------------------------------------------------
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _credential_statement(account_uuid: str) -> typing.Any:
+        """Build the SELECT that loads an Account's TOTP credential row."""
+        entity = totp.TotpCredential
+        return sqlalchemy.select(entity).where(entity.account_uuid == account_uuid)
+
+    async def get_credential(self, account_uuid: str) -> totp.TotpCredential | None:
+        """Load the (single) TOTP credential row for an Account, if any."""
+        statement = self._credential_statement(account_uuid)
+        async with self._session_factory()() as session:
+            return await session.scalar(statement)
+
+    async def is_enabled(self, account_uuid: str) -> bool:
+        """Return whether the Account has a confirmed, enabled TOTP credential."""
+        credential = await self.get_credential(account_uuid)
+        return bool(credential and credential.enabled)
+
+    async def begin_enrollment(self, account: user.User) -> tuple[TotpEnrollment, list[str]]:
+        """Create or replace a pending TOTP secret and return recovery codes.
+
+        A previous *enabled* credential is left untouched until the new secret
+        is confirmed, so a failed re-enrolment cannot lock the account out.
+        """
+        secret = self.generate_secret()
+        uri = self.build_otpauth_uri(secret, account_name=account.user)
+        plaintext_codes, hashed_codes = await self.generate_recovery_codes()
+
+        async with self._session_factory()() as session:
+            async with session.begin():
+                credential = await session.scalar(self._credential_statement(account.uuid))
+                if credential is None:
+                    credential = totp.TotpCredential(
+                        uuid=str(uuid.uuid4()),
+                        account_uuid=account.uuid,
+                        secret_encrypted=self._encrypt_secret(secret),
+                        account_name=account.user,
+                        enabled=False,
+                        recovery_codes=json.dumps(hashed_codes),
+                    )
+                    session.add(credential)
+                elif not credential.enabled:
+                    credential.secret_encrypted = self._encrypt_secret(secret)
+                    credential.account_name = account.user
+                    credential.recovery_codes = json.dumps(hashed_codes)
+                else:
+                    raise TotpAlreadyEnabledError('TOTP is already enabled for this account')
+                await session.flush()
+
+        return TotpEnrollment(secret=secret, otpauth_uri=uri), plaintext_codes
+
+    async def confirm_enrollment(self, account_uuid: str, code: str) -> None:
+        """Verify the first code and flip the credential to enabled."""
+        credential = await self.get_credential(account_uuid)
+        if credential is None:
+            raise TotpNotEnabledError('No pending TOTP enrolment found')
+        if credential.enabled:
+            raise TotpAlreadyEnabledError('TOTP is already enabled for this account')
+
+        try:
+            code_matches = self.verify_code(self._decrypt_secret(credential.secret_encrypted), code)
+        except TotpInvalidCodeError:
+            code_matches = False
+        if not code_matches:
+            raise TotpInvalidCodeError('Invalid verification code')
+
+        async with self._session_factory()() as session:
+            async with session.begin():
+                record = await session.scalar(self._credential_statement(account_uuid))
+                if record is None:
+                    raise TotpNotEnabledError('No pending TOTP enrolment found')
+                record.enabled = True
+                record.last_used_at = datetime.datetime.now()
+
+    async def verify_for_account(self, account_uuid: str, code: str) -> bool:
+        """Validate a live TOTP code for an enabled credential."""
+        credential = await self.get_credential(account_uuid)
+        if credential is None or not credential.enabled:
+            return False
+        try:
+            secret = self._decrypt_secret(credential.secret_encrypted)
+        except TotpInvalidCodeError:
+            return False
+        if not self.verify_code(secret, code):
+            return False
+        async with self._session_factory()() as session:
+            async with session.begin():
+                record = await session.scalar(self._credential_statement(account_uuid))
+                if record is not None:
+                    record.last_used_at = datetime.datetime.now()
+        return True
+
+    @classmethod
+    def _match_recovery_code(cls, code: str, hashed_codes: list[str]) -> int:
+        """Return the index of the matching digest, or -1. Constant-time per entry."""
+        candidate = cls._normalise_recovery_code(code)
+        for index, stored in enumerate(hashed_codes):
+            parsed = cls._split_recovery_digest(stored)
+            if parsed is None:
+                continue
+            iterations, salt, expected = parsed
+            digest = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', candidate.encode('utf-8'), salt, iterations)
+            if hmac.compare_digest(digest, expected):
+                return index
+        return -1
+
+    async def redeem_recovery_code(self, account_uuid: str, code: str) -> bool:
+        """Consume a one-time recovery code for password reset fallback."""
+        credential = await self.get_credential(account_uuid)
+        if credential is None:
+            return False
+
+        hashed_codes: list[str] = []
+        if credential.recovery_codes:
+            try:
+                parsed = json.loads(credential.recovery_codes)
+                if isinstance(parsed, list):
+                    hashed_codes = [str(item) for item in parsed]
+            except (ValueError, TypeError):
+                hashed_codes = []
+
+        # Recomputing PBKDF2 for up to 10 salted digests is CPU-bound; keep it
+        # off the event loop so a recovery attempt cannot stall other requests.
+        matched_index = await asyncio.to_thread(self._match_recovery_code, code or '', hashed_codes)
+        if matched_index < 0:
+            return False
+
+        remaining = hashed_codes[:matched_index] + hashed_codes[matched_index + 1 :]
+        async with self._session_factory()() as session:
+            async with session.begin():
+                record = await session.scalar(self._credential_statement(account_uuid))
+                if record is not None:
+                    record.recovery_codes = json.dumps(remaining)
+                    record.last_used_at = datetime.datetime.now()
+        return True
+
+    async def regenerate_recovery_codes(self, account_uuid: str) -> tuple[None, list[str]]:
+        """Replace the recovery codes for an enabled credential.
+
+        The caller is responsible for proving possession of a valid TOTP code
+        first; this method only swaps the stored digests for a fresh set and
+        returns the plaintext codes for one-time display.
+        """
+        credential = await self.get_credential(account_uuid)
+        if credential is None or not credential.enabled:
+            raise TotpNotEnabledError('TOTP is not enabled for this account')
+
+        plaintext_codes, hashed_codes = await self.generate_recovery_codes()
+        async with self._session_factory()() as session:
+            async with session.begin():
+                record = await session.scalar(self._credential_statement(account_uuid))
+                if record is None:
+                    raise TotpNotEnabledError('TOTP is not enabled for this account')
+                record.recovery_codes = json.dumps(hashed_codes)
+                record.updated_at = datetime.datetime.now()
+        return None, plaintext_codes
+
+    async def disable(self, account_uuid: str, code: str) -> bool:
+        """Remove TOTP after the caller proves possession of a valid factor."""
+        credential = await self.get_credential(account_uuid)
+        if credential is None or not credential.enabled:
+            raise TotpNotEnabledError('TOTP is not enabled for this account')
+
+        try:
+            secret = self._decrypt_secret(credential.secret_encrypted)
+            code_matches = self.verify_code(secret, code)
+        except TotpInvalidCodeError:
+            code_matches = False
+        if not code_matches:
+            raise TotpInvalidCodeError('Invalid verification code')
+
+        async with self._session_factory()() as session:
+            async with session.begin():
+                record = await session.scalar(self._credential_statement(account_uuid))
+                if record is not None:
+                    await session.delete(record)
+        return True
+
+    async def remaining_recovery_codes(self, account_uuid: str) -> int:
+        """Return how many unused recovery codes remain for the Account."""
+        credential = await self.get_credential(account_uuid)
+        if credential is None or not credential.recovery_codes:
+            return 0
+        try:
+            parsed = json.loads(credential.recovery_codes)
+        except (ValueError, TypeError):
+            return 0
+        return len(parsed) if isinstance(parsed, list) else 0

src/langbot/pkg/core/app.py

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ from ..api.http.service import apikey as apikey_service
 from ..api.http.service import webhook as webhook_service
 from ..api.http.service import monitoring as monitoring_service
 from ..api.http.service import skill as skill_service
+from ..api.http.service import totp as totp_service
 from ..api.http.service import maintenance as maintenance_service
 from ..discover import engine as discover_engine
 from ..storage import mgr as storagemgr
@@ -161,6 +162,8 @@ class Application:
 
     user_service: user_service.UserService = None
 
+    totp_service: totp_service.TotpService = None
+
     space_service: space_service.SpaceService = None
 
     llm_model_service: model_service.LLMModelsService = None

src/langbot/pkg/core/stages/build_app.py

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ from ...api.http.service import apikey as apikey_service
 from ...api.http.service import webhook as webhook_service
 from ...api.http.service import monitoring as monitoring_service
 from ...api.http.service import skill as skill_service
+from ...api.http.service import totp as totp_service
 from ...skill import manager as skill_mgr
 from ...api.http.service import maintenance as maintenance_service
 from ...discover import engine as discover_engine
@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ class BuildAppStage(stage.BootingStage):
         user_service_inst = user_service.UserService(ap)
         ap.user_service = user_service_inst
 
+        totp_service_inst = totp_service.TotpService(ap)
+        ap.totp_service = totp_service_inst
+
         async def resolve_singleton_execution_context() -> ExecutionContext:
             if workspace_policy.multi_workspace_enabled:
                 raise WorkspaceRequiredError('Cloud runtime work requires an explicit Workspace context')

src/langbot/pkg/entity/persistence/totp.py

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+"""Persistence entity for per-Account TOTP (RFC 6238) second factors."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import uuid as uuid_lib
+
+import sqlalchemy
+
+from .base import Base
+
+
+class TotpCredential(Base):
+    """Per-Account TOTP (RFC 6238) second factor and its recovery codes.
+
+    A single row is kept per Account. The shared secret is stored encrypted
+    (``secret_encrypted``, Fernet keyed off the instance JWT secret via HKDF)
+    rather than in plaintext, and remains unenforced until the owner confirms
+    possession by submitting a valid code (``enabled``). Recovery codes are
+    stored only as salted PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 digests, so a database leak does
+    not hand out account recovery. No plaintext secret or recovery code is ever
+    persisted; both leave the server exactly once, in the enrolment response.
+    """
+
+    __tablename__ = 'totp_credentials'
+
+    id = sqlalchemy.Column(sqlalchemy.Integer, primary_key=True, autoincrement=True)
+    uuid = sqlalchemy.Column(
+        sqlalchemy.String(36),
+        nullable=False,
+        default=lambda: str(uuid_lib.uuid4()),
+    )
+    account_uuid = sqlalchemy.Column(
+        sqlalchemy.String(36),
+        sqlalchemy.ForeignKey('users.uuid', ondelete='CASCADE'),
+        nullable=False,
+    )
+    # Fernet-encrypted base32 secret; never exposed to the client after enrol.
+    secret_encrypted = sqlalchemy.Column(sqlalchemy.Text, nullable=False)
+    # Issuer label shown inside the authenticator app (e.g. the account email).
+    account_name = sqlalchemy.Column(sqlalchemy.String(320), nullable=False)
+    enabled = sqlalchemy.Column(sqlalchemy.Boolean, nullable=False, server_default='0')
+    # JSON-encoded list of salted PBKDF2 hashes for the one-time recovery codes.
+    recovery_codes = sqlalchemy.Column(sqlalchemy.Text, nullable=True)
+    last_used_at = sqlalchemy.Column(sqlalchemy.DateTime, nullable=True)
+    created_at = sqlalchemy.Column(
+        sqlalchemy.DateTime,
+        nullable=False,
+        server_default=sqlalchemy.func.now(),
+    )
+    updated_at = sqlalchemy.Column(
+        sqlalchemy.DateTime,
+        nullable=False,
+        server_default=sqlalchemy.func.now(),
+        onupdate=sqlalchemy.func.now(),
+    )
+
+    __table_args__ = (
+        sqlalchemy.Index('uq_totp_credentials_uuid', 'uuid', unique=True),
+        sqlalchemy.Index('uq_totp_credentials_account', 'account_uuid', unique=True),
+    )

src/langbot/pkg/persistence/alembic/versions/0025_totp_credentials.py

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+"""add totp credentials table
+
+Revision ID: 0025_totp_credentials
+Revises: 0024_passkey_credentials
+Create Date: 2026-09-12
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import sqlalchemy as sa
+from alembic import op
+
+revision = '0025_totp_credentials'
+down_revision = '0024_passkey_credentials'
+branch_labels = None
+depends_on = None
+
+_TABLE_NAME = 'totp_credentials'
+
+
+def upgrade() -> None:
+    conn = op.get_bind()
+    existing_tables = set(sa.inspect(conn).get_table_names())
+    if _TABLE_NAME not in existing_tables:
+        op.create_table(
+            _TABLE_NAME,
+            sa.Column('id', sa.Integer(), primary_key=True, autoincrement=True),
+            sa.Column('uuid', sa.String(36), nullable=False),
+            sa.Column(
+                'account_uuid',
+                sa.String(36),
+                sa.ForeignKey('users.uuid', ondelete='CASCADE'),
+                nullable=False,
+            ),
+            sa.Column('secret_encrypted', sa.Text(), nullable=False),
+            sa.Column('account_name', sa.String(320), nullable=False),
+            sa.Column('enabled', sa.Boolean(), nullable=False, server_default='0'),
+            sa.Column('recovery_codes', sa.Text(), nullable=True),
+            sa.Column('last_used_at', sa.DateTime(), nullable=True),
+            sa.Column('created_at', sa.DateTime(), nullable=False, server_default=sa.func.now()),
+            sa.Column('updated_at', sa.DateTime(), nullable=False, server_default=sa.func.now()),
+        )
+        op.create_index('uq_totp_credentials_uuid', _TABLE_NAME, ['uuid'], unique=True)
+        op.create_index('uq_totp_credentials_account', _TABLE_NAME, ['account_uuid'], unique=True)
+
+
+def downgrade() -> None:
+    op.drop_index('uq_totp_credentials_account', table_name=_TABLE_NAME)
+    op.drop_index('uq_totp_credentials_uuid', table_name=_TABLE_NAME)
+    op.drop_table(_TABLE_NAME)

web/src/app/home/components/account-settings-dialog/AccountSettingsPanel.tsx

@@ -21,9 +21,11 @@ import {
   Plus,
   Trash2,
   Pencil,
+  ShieldCheck,
 } from 'lucide-react';
 import { startRegistration } from '@simplewebauthn/browser';
 import PasswordChangeDialog from '../password-change-dialog/PasswordChangeDialog';
+import TotpEnrollDialog from './TotpEnrollDialog';
 import { PanelBody } from '../settings-dialog/panel-layout';
 
 interface AccountSettingsPanelProps {
@@ -56,11 +58,16 @@ export default function AccountSettingsPanel({
   const [passkeys, setPasskeys] = useState<PasskeyItem[]>([]);
   const [passkeyLoading, setPasskeyLoading] = useState(false);
   const [registeringPasskey, setRegisteringPasskey] = useState(false);
+  const [totpEnabled, setTotpEnabled] = useState(false);
+  const [remainingRecoveryCodes, setRemainingRecoveryCodes] = useState(0);
+  const [totpLoading, setTotpLoading] = useState(false);
+  const [totpDialogOpen, setTotpDialogOpen] = useState(false);
 
   useEffect(() => {
     if (active) {
       loadUserInfo();
       loadPasskeys();
+      loadTotpStatus();
     }
   }, [active]);
 
@@ -91,6 +98,19 @@ export default function AccountSettingsPanel({
     }
   }
 
+  async function loadTotpStatus() {
+    setTotpLoading(true);
+    try {
+      const status = await httpClient.getTotpStatus();
+      setTotpEnabled(status.enabled);
+      setRemainingRecoveryCodes(status.remaining_recovery_codes);
+    } catch {
+      // ignore
+    } finally {
+      setTotpLoading(false);
+    }
+  }
+
   const handleAddPasskey = async () => {
     setRegisteringPasskey(true);
     try {
@@ -332,6 +352,56 @@ export default function AccountSettingsPanel({
               </div>
             )}
           </div>
+
+          {/* TOTP (2FA) Section */}
+          <div className="pt-4 space-y-3">
+            <div className="flex items-center justify-between">
+              <div>
+                <h4 className="text-sm font-medium">
+                  {t('account.totpSectionTitle')}
+                </h4>
+                <p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
+                  {t('account.totpSectionDesc')}
+                </p>
+              </div>
+              <Button
+                variant="outline"
+                size="sm"
+                onClick={() => setTotpDialogOpen(true)}
+                disabled={totpLoading || !systemInfo.allow_modify_login_info}
+                className="cursor-pointer"
+              >
+                {totpLoading ? (
+                  <Loader2 className="mr-2 h-4 w-4 animate-spin" />
+                ) : (
+                  <ShieldCheck className="mr-2 h-4 w-4" />
+                )}
+                {totpEnabled
+                  ? t('account.disableTotp')
+                  : t('account.enableTotp')}
+              </Button>
+            </div>
+
+            <Item size="sm" variant="muted" className="rounded-lg">
+              <ItemMedia variant="icon">
+                <ShieldCheck className="h-4 w-4" />
+              </ItemMedia>
+              <ItemContent>
+                <ItemTitle>
+                  {totpEnabled
+                    ? t('account.totpEnabled')
+                    : t('account.totpDisabled')}
+                </ItemTitle>
+                <ItemDescription>
+                  {totpEnabled
+                    ? t('account.totpRecoveryCodesRemaining', {
+                        count: remainingRecoveryCodes,
+                      })
+                    : t('account.totpSectionDesc')}
+                </ItemDescription>
+              </ItemContent>
+            </Item>
+          </div>
         </div>
       )}
 
@@ -340,6 +410,13 @@ export default function AccountSettingsPanel({
         onOpenChange={handlePasswordDialogClose}
         hasPassword={hasPassword}
       />
+
+      <TotpEnrollDialog
+        open={totpDialogOpen}
+        onOpenChange={setTotpDialogOpen}
+        enabled={totpEnabled}
+        onChanged={loadTotpStatus}
+      />
     </PanelBody>
   );
 }

web/src/app/infra/http/BackendClient.ts

@@ -1241,10 +1241,21 @@ export class BackendClient extends BaseHttpClient {
     );
   }
 
-  public authUser(user: string, password: string): Promise<ApiRespUserToken> {
+  public authUser(
+    user: string,
+    password: string,
+    secondFactor?: { totpCode?: string; recoveryCode?: string },
+  ): Promise<ApiRespUserToken> {
     return this.post(
       '/api/v1/user/auth',
-      { user, password },
+      {
+        user,
+        password,
+        ...(secondFactor?.totpCode ? { totp_code: secondFactor.totpCode } : {}),
+        ...(secondFactor?.recoveryCode
+          ? { recovery_code: secondFactor.recoveryCode }
+          : {}),
+      },
       { skipWorkspace: true },
     );
   }
@@ -1257,15 +1268,25 @@ export class BackendClient extends BaseHttpClient {
 
   public resetPassword(
     user: string,
-    recoveryKey: string,
     newPassword: string,
+    factor:
+      | { recoveryKey: string }
+      | { totpCode: string }
+      | { recoveryCode: string },
   ): Promise<{ user: string }> {
     return this.post(
       '/api/v1/user/reset-password',
       {
         user,
-        recovery_key: recoveryKey,
         new_password: newPassword,
+        // Exactly one proof-of-ownership factor is accepted by the backend.
+        ...('recoveryKey' in factor
+          ? { recovery_key: factor.recoveryKey }
+          : {}),
+        ...('totpCode' in factor ? { totp_code: factor.totpCode } : {}),
+        ...('recoveryCode' in factor
+          ? { recovery_code: factor.recoveryCode }
+          : {}),
       },
       { skipWorkspace: true },
     );
@@ -1290,6 +1311,7 @@ export class BackendClient extends BaseHttpClient {
     user: string;
     account_type: 'local' | 'space';
     has_password: boolean;
+    totp_enabled?: boolean;
   }> {
     return this.get('/api/v1/user/info', undefined, { skipWorkspace: true });
   }
@@ -1306,12 +1328,28 @@ export class BackendClient extends BaseHttpClient {
     space_login_enabled?: boolean;
     passkey_login_enabled?: boolean;
     passkey_supported?: boolean;
+    totp_supported?: boolean;
   }> {
     return this.get('/api/v1/user/account-info', undefined, {
       skipWorkspace: true,
     });
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Whether the account identified by the given email has TOTP enabled.
+   *
+   * This endpoint is unauthenticated so the password-recovery page can decide
+   * whether to offer the TOTP / recovery-code verification methods. The
+   * response only exposes the boolean capability.
+   */
+  public checkTotpForEmail(user: string): Promise<{ totp_enabled: boolean }> {
+    return this.post(
+      '/api/v1/user/totp/check',
+      { user },
+      { skipWorkspace: true },
+    );
+  }
+
   // ============ Passkey (WebAuthn) API ============
   public getPasskeyAuthOptions(
     email?: string,
@@ -1390,6 +1428,51 @@ export class BackendClient extends BaseHttpClient {
     });
   }
 
+  // ============ TOTP (2FA) API ============
+  public getTotpStatus(): Promise<{
+    enabled: boolean;
+    remaining_recovery_codes: number;
+  }> {
+    return this.get('/api/v1/user/totp/status', undefined, {
+      skipWorkspace: true,
+    });
+  }
+
+  public beginTotpEnrollment(): Promise<{
+    secret: string;
+    otpauth_uri: string;
+    qr_svg: string;
+    recovery_codes: string[];
+  }> {
+    return this.post('/api/v1/user/totp/enroll', {}, { skipWorkspace: true });
+  }
+
+  public verifyTotpEnrollment(code: string): Promise<{ enabled: boolean }> {
+    return this.post(
+      '/api/v1/user/totp/enroll/verify',
+      { code },
+      { skipWorkspace: true },
+    );
+  }
+
+  public regenerateTotpRecoveryCodes(
+    code: string,
+  ): Promise<{ recovery_codes: string[] }> {
+    return this.post(
+      '/api/v1/user/totp/recovery-codes',
+      { code },
+      { skipWorkspace: true },
+    );
+  }
+
+  public disableTotp(code: string): Promise<{ success: boolean }> {
+    return this.post(
+      '/api/v1/user/totp/disable',
+      { code },
+      { skipWorkspace: true },
+    );
+  }
+
   // ============ Workspace API ============
   public getWorkspaceBootstrap(): Promise<WorkspaceBootstrapResponse> {
     return this.get('/api/v1/workspaces/bootstrap', undefined, {

web/src/app/login/page.tsx

@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ import {
   RefreshCw,
   Layers,
   Fingerprint,
+  ShieldCheck,
 } from 'lucide-react';
 import { startAuthentication } from '@simplewebauthn/browser';
 import langbotIcon from '@/app/assets/langbot-logo.webp';
@@ -71,6 +72,15 @@ export default function Login() {
   const [loadError, setLoadError] = useState<string | null>(null);
   const [retrying, setRetrying] = useState(false);
   const autoSpaceLoginStarted = useRef(false);
+  // Second-factor state: when /auth replies with totp_required we keep the
+  // credentials and ask for a TOTP or recovery code instead of a password.
+  const [totpRequired, setTotpRequired] = useState(false);
+  const [totpCode, setTotpCode] = useState('');
+  const [totpSubmitting, setTotpSubmitting] = useState(false);
+  const [pendingCredentials, setPendingCredentials] = useState<{
+    username: string;
+    password: string;
+  } | null>(null);
 
   const form = useForm<z.infer<ReturnType<typeof formSchema>>>({
     resolver: zodResolver(formSchema(t)),
@@ -223,11 +233,49 @@ export default function Login() {
           toast.success(t('common.loginSuccess'));
         }
       })
-      .catch(() => {
+      .catch((error: unknown) => {
+        const apiError = error as { code?: string };
+        if (apiError?.code === 'totp_required') {
+          // Password was accepted; the account additionally requires TOTP.
+          setPendingCredentials({ username, password });
+          setTotpCode('');
+          setTotpRequired(true);
+          return;
+        }
         toast.error(t('common.loginFailed'));
       });
   }
 
+  async function handleTotpSubmit() {
+    if (!pendingCredentials || !totpCode.trim()) {
+      return;
+    }
+    setTotpSubmitting(true);
+    try {
+      const code = totpCode.trim();
+      // A recovery code is longer than six digits; treat it as such so users
+      // can sign in even when the authenticator is unavailable.
+      const isRecoveryCode = code.replace(/\s/g, '').length !== 6;
+      const res = await httpClient.authUser(
+        pendingCredentials.username,
+        pendingCredentials.password,
+        isRecoveryCode ? { recoveryCode: code } : { totpCode: code },
+      );
+      setTotpRequired(false);
+      setPendingCredentials(null);
+      if (await finishLogin(res.token, pendingCredentials.username)) {
+        toast.success(t('common.loginSuccess'));
+      }
+    } catch (error: unknown) {
+      const apiError = error as { code?: string; message?: string };
+      // Keep the second-factor step open so the user can retry; surface the
+      // server message when available.
+      toast.error(apiError?.message || t('common.loginTotpInvalid'));
+    } finally {
+      setTotpSubmitting(false);
+    }
+  }
+
   const handleSpaceLoginClick = useCallback(async () => {
     setSpaceLoading(true);
     try {
@@ -336,8 +384,67 @@ export default function Login() {
           </CardDescription>
         </CardHeader>
         <CardContent className="space-y-6">
+          {/* TOTP second-factor step: shown after the password is accepted. */}
+          {totpRequired && (
+            <div className="space-y-4">
+              <div className="flex flex-col items-center gap-1 text-center">
+                <ShieldCheck className="h-8 w-8 text-primary" />
+                <p className="text-sm font-medium">
+                  {t('common.loginTotpTitle')}
+                </p>
+                <p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
+                  {t('common.loginTotpDesc')}
+                </p>
+              </div>
+              <div className="relative">
+                <ShieldCheck className="absolute left-3 top-3 h-4 w-4 text-gray-400" />
+                <Input
+                  value={totpCode}
+                  onChange={(e) => setTotpCode(e.target.value)}
+                  placeholder={t('common.loginTotpPlaceholder')}
+                  className="pl-10 font-mono tracking-widest"
+                  inputMode="text"
+                  autoComplete="one-time-code"
+                  autoFocus
+                  onKeyDown={(e) => {
+                    if (e.key === 'Enter') {
+                      void handleTotpSubmit();
+                    }
+                  }}
+                />
+              </div>
+              <Button
+                type="button"
+                className="w-full cursor-pointer"
+                onClick={handleTotpSubmit}
+                disabled={totpSubmitting || !totpCode.trim()}
+              >
+                {totpSubmitting ? (
+                  <Loader2 className="mr-2 h-4 w-4 animate-spin" />
+                ) : (
+                  <ShieldCheck className="mr-2 h-4 w-4" />
+                )}
+                {totpSubmitting
+                  ? t('common.loginTotpVerifying')
+                  : t('common.loginTotpVerify')}
+              </Button>
+              <Button
+                type="button"
+                variant="ghost"
+                className="w-full cursor-pointer"
+                onClick={() => {
+                  setTotpRequired(false);
+                  setPendingCredentials(null);
+                  setTotpCode('');
+                }}
+              >
+                {t('common.backToLogin')}
+              </Button>
+            </div>
+          )}
+
           {/* Space and password login are per-account capabilities. */}
-          {showSpaceLogin && (
+          {!totpRequired && showSpaceLogin && (
             <div className="space-y-3">
               <Button
                 type="button"
@@ -355,7 +462,7 @@ export default function Login() {
             </div>
           )}
 
-          {showPasskeyLogin && (
+          {!totpRequired && showPasskeyLogin && (
             <div className="space-y-3">
               <Button
                 type="button"
@@ -375,21 +482,23 @@ export default function Login() {
           )}
 
           {/* Divider - only show if both login methods are available */}
-          {(showSpaceLogin || showPasskeyLogin) && showLocalLogin && (
-            <div className="relative">
-              <div className="absolute inset-0 flex items-center">
-                <span className="w-full border-t" />
+          {!totpRequired &&
+            (showSpaceLogin || showPasskeyLogin) &&
+            showLocalLogin && (
+              <div className="relative">
+                <div className="absolute inset-0 flex items-center">
+                  <span className="w-full border-t" />
+                </div>
+                <div className="relative flex justify-center text-xs uppercase">
+                  <span className="bg-white dark:bg-card px-2 text-muted-foreground">
+                    {t('common.or')}
+                  </span>
+                </div>
               </div>
-              <div className="relative flex justify-center text-xs uppercase">
-                <span className="bg-white dark:bg-card px-2 text-muted-foreground">
-                  {t('common.or')}
-                </span>
-              </div>
-            </div>
-          )}
+            )}
 
           {/* Password login remains available to every account with a password. */}
-          {showLocalLogin && (
+          {!totpRequired && showLocalLogin && (
             <Form {...form}>
               <form
                 onSubmit={form.handleSubmit(onSubmit)}

web/src/app/register/page.tsx

@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ import {
 import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
 import { httpClient } from '@/app/infra/http/HttpClient';
 import { useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom';
-import { Mail, Lock, Loader2, Info, Layers } from 'lucide-react';
+import { Mail, Lock, Loader2, Info, Layers, ShieldCheck } from 'lucide-react';
 import {
   Popover,
   PopoverContent,
@@ -236,6 +236,11 @@ export default function Register() {
                   >
                     {t('register.registerWithPassword')}
                   </Button>
+                  {/* Recommend enabling TOTP once the account exists */}
+                  <p className="flex items-start gap-1.5 text-xs text-muted-foreground">
+                    <ShieldCheck className="mt-0.5 h-3.5 w-3.5 shrink-0 text-primary" />
+                    <span>{t('register.totpHint')}</span>
+                  </p>
                 </form>
               </Form>
             </>

web/src/app/reset-password/page.tsx

@@ -19,19 +19,24 @@ import {
   FormMessage,
   FormDescription,
 } from '@/components/ui/form';
-import { useState } from 'react';
+import { Tabs, TabsList, TabsTrigger } from '@/components/ui/tabs';
+import { useEffect, useState } from 'react';
 import { httpClient } from '@/app/infra/http/HttpClient';
 import { useNavigate } from 'react-router-dom';
-import { Mail, Lock, ArrowLeft, KeyRound } from 'lucide-react';
+import { Mail, Lock, ArrowLeft, KeyRound, ShieldCheck } from 'lucide-react';
 import { toast } from 'sonner';
 import { useTranslation } from 'react-i18next';
 import { Link } from 'react-router-dom';
 import { ThemeToggle } from '@/components/ui/theme-toggle';
 
+type RecoveryMethod = 'recoveryKey' | 'totp' | 'recoveryCode';
+
 const formSchema = (t: (key: string) => string) =>
   z.object({
     email: z.string().email(t('common.invalidEmail')),
-    recoveryKey: z.string().min(1, t('resetPassword.recoveryKeyRequired')),
+    recoveryKey: z.string().optional(),
+    totpCode: z.string().optional(),
+    recoveryCode: z.string().optional(),
     newPassword: z.string().min(1, t('resetPassword.newPasswordRequired')),
   });
 
@@ -39,34 +44,129 @@ export default function ResetPassword() {
   const navigate = useNavigate();
   const { t } = useTranslation();
   const [isResetting, setIsResetting] = useState(false);
+  const [method, setMethod] = useState<RecoveryMethod>('recoveryKey');
+  // Whether TOTP is enabled for the email currently entered. `null` means we have
+  // not yet resolved it (empty/invalid email), so the TOTP methods stay disabled
+  // until we can confirm the account actually enrolled one.
+  const [totpEnabledForEmail, setTotpEnabledForEmail] = useState<
+    boolean | null
+  >(null);
 
   const form = useForm<z.infer<ReturnType<typeof formSchema>>>({
     resolver: zodResolver(formSchema(t)),
     defaultValues: {
       email: '',
       recoveryKey: '',
+      totpCode: '',
+      recoveryCode: '',
       newPassword: '',
     },
   });
 
+  // Watch the email so we can resolve, per account, whether TOTP is enabled.
+  const email = form.watch('email');
+
+  // Resolve whether the entered email has TOTP enabled; only then may the user
+  // pick the TOTP / recovery-code verification methods. While unresolved (empty
+  // or invalid email) both TOTP methods stay disabled, so an account without
+  // TOTP can never select them.
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (!email || !z.string().email().safeParse(email).success) {
+      setTotpEnabledForEmail(null);
+      setMethod('recoveryKey');
+      return;
+    }
+    let cancelled = false;
+    // Debounce so we only query once the user pauses typing.
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      httpClient
+        .checkTotpForEmail(email)
+        .then((res) => {
+          if (cancelled) {
+            return;
+          }
+          setTotpEnabledForEmail(res.totp_enabled);
+          if (!res.totp_enabled) {
+            setMethod('recoveryKey');
+          }
+        })
+        .catch(() => {
+          if (!cancelled) {
+            // Fail closed: if we cannot confirm TOTP, only the recovery key is
+            // offered rather than letting an unverified TOTP path through.
+            setTotpEnabledForEmail(null);
+            setMethod('recoveryKey');
+          }
+        });
+    }, 400);
+    return () => {
+      cancelled = true;
+      clearTimeout(timer);
+    };
+  }, [email]);
+
+  const totpMethodsDisabled = totpEnabledForEmail !== true;
+
   function onSubmit(values: z.infer<ReturnType<typeof formSchema>>) {
-    handleResetPassword(values.email, values.recoveryKey, values.newPassword);
+    if (method === 'recoveryKey') {
+      if (!values.recoveryKey || !values.recoveryKey.trim()) {
+        toast.error(t('resetPassword.recoveryKeyRequired'));
+        return;
+      }
+      handleResetPassword(
+        values.email,
+        { recoveryKey: values.recoveryKey.trim() },
+        values.newPassword,
+      );
+      return;
+    }
+    if (method === 'totp') {
+      if (!values.totpCode || !values.totpCode.trim()) {
+        toast.error(t('resetPassword.totpCodeRequired'));
+        return;
+      }
+      handleResetPassword(
+        values.email,
+        { totpCode: values.totpCode.trim() },
+        values.newPassword,
+      );
+      return;
+    }
+    if (!values.recoveryCode || !values.recoveryCode.trim()) {
+      toast.error(t('resetPassword.recoveryCodeRequired'));
+      return;
+    }
+    handleResetPassword(
+      values.email,
+      { recoveryCode: values.recoveryCode.trim() },
+      values.newPassword,
+    );
   }
 
   function handleResetPassword(
     email: string,
-    recoveryKey: string,
+    factor:
+      | { recoveryKey: string }
+      | { totpCode: string }
+      | { recoveryCode: string },
     newPassword: string,
   ) {
     setIsResetting(true);
     httpClient
-      .resetPassword(email, recoveryKey, newPassword)
+      .resetPassword(email, newPassword, factor)
       .then(() => {
         toast.success(t('resetPassword.resetSuccess'));
         navigate('/login');
       })
-      .catch(() => {
-        toast.error(t('resetPassword.resetFailed'));
+      .catch((error: unknown) => {
+        const apiError = error as { code?: string };
+        if (apiError?.code === 'totp_not_enabled') {
+          toast.error(t('resetPassword.totpNotEnabled'));
+        } else if (apiError?.code === 'totp_invalid_code') {
+          toast.error(t('resetPassword.invalidTotpCode'));
+        } else {
+          toast.error(t('resetPassword.resetFailed'));
+        }
       })
       .finally(() => {
         setIsResetting(false);
@@ -118,32 +218,124 @@ export default function ResetPassword() {
                 )}
               />
 
-              <FormField
-                control={form.control}
-                name="recoveryKey"
-                render={({ field }) => (
-                  <FormItem>
-                    <FormLabel>{t('resetPassword.recoveryKey')}</FormLabel>
-                    <FormDescription>
-                      {t('resetPassword.recoveryKeyDescription')}
-                    </FormDescription>
-                    <FormControl>
-                      {/* Recovery keys are case-sensitive base64url strings; send them verbatim */}
-                      <div className="relative">
-                        <KeyRound className="absolute left-3 top-3 h-4 w-4 text-gray-400" />
-                        <Input
-                          placeholder={t('resetPassword.enterRecoveryKey')}
-                          className="pl-10 font-mono"
-                          autoComplete="off"
-                          spellCheck={false}
-                          {...field}
-                        />
-                      </div>
-                    </FormControl>
-                    <FormMessage />
-                  </FormItem>
+              {/* Recovery method selector: recovery key, TOTP, or recovery code.
+                  The TOTP-based methods are only selectable once we have
+                  confirmed the entered account actually enrolled TOTP. */}
+              <div className="space-y-3">
+                <FormLabel>{t('resetPassword.verifyMethod')}</FormLabel>
+                <Tabs
+                  value={method}
+                  onValueChange={(v) => setMethod(v as RecoveryMethod)}
+                >
+                  <TabsList className="w-full">
+                    <TabsTrigger value="recoveryKey" className="flex-1">
+                      {t('resetPassword.recoveryKey')}
+                    </TabsTrigger>
+                    <TabsTrigger
+                      value="totp"
+                      className="flex-1"
+                      disabled={totpMethodsDisabled}
+                    >
+                      {t('resetPassword.totpMethod')}
+                    </TabsTrigger>
+                    <TabsTrigger
+                      value="recoveryCode"
+                      className="flex-1"
+                      disabled={totpMethodsDisabled}
+                    >
+                      {t('resetPassword.recoveryCodeMethod')}
+                    </TabsTrigger>
+                  </TabsList>
+                </Tabs>
+                {totpMethodsDisabled && (
+                  <p className="text-xs text-muted-foreground">
+                    {t('resetPassword.totpMethodsUnavailable')}
+                  </p>
                 )}
-              />
+              </div>
+
+              {method === 'recoveryKey' && (
+                <FormField
+                  control={form.control}
+                  name="recoveryKey"
+                  render={({ field }) => (
+                    <FormItem>
+                      <FormLabel>{t('resetPassword.recoveryKey')}</FormLabel>
+                      <FormDescription>
+                        {t('resetPassword.recoveryKeyDescription')}
+                      </FormDescription>
+                      <FormControl>
+                        {/* Recovery keys are case-sensitive base64url strings; send them verbatim */}
+                        <div className="relative">
+                          <KeyRound className="absolute left-3 top-3 h-4 w-4 text-gray-400" />
+                          <Input
+                            placeholder={t('resetPassword.enterRecoveryKey')}
+                            className="pl-10 font-mono"
+                            autoComplete="off"
+                            spellCheck={false}
+                            {...field}
+                          />
+                        </div>
+                      </FormControl>
+                      <FormMessage />
+                    </FormItem>
+                  )}
+                />
+              )}
+
+              {method === 'totp' && (
+                <FormField
+                  control={form.control}
+                  name="totpCode"
+                  render={({ field }) => (
+                    <FormItem>
+                      <FormLabel>{t('resetPassword.totpCode')}</FormLabel>
+                      <FormDescription>
+                        {t('resetPassword.totpMethodDescription')}
+                      </FormDescription>
+                      <FormControl>
+                        <div className="relative">
+                          <ShieldCheck className="absolute left-3 top-3 h-4 w-4 text-gray-400" />
+                          <Input
+                            placeholder={t('resetPassword.enterTotpCode')}
+                            className="pl-10 font-mono tracking-widest"
+                            inputMode="numeric"
+                            autoComplete="one-time-code"
+                            maxLength={6}
+                            {...field}
+                          />
+                        </div>
+                      </FormControl>
+                      <FormMessage />
+                    </FormItem>
+                  )}
+                />
+              )}
+
+              {method === 'recoveryCode' && (
+                <FormField
+                  control={form.control}
+                  name="recoveryCode"
+                  render={({ field }) => (
+                    <FormItem>
+                      <FormLabel>{t('resetPassword.recoveryCode')}</FormLabel>
+                      <FormControl>
+                        <div className="relative">
+                          <ShieldCheck className="absolute left-3 top-3 h-4 w-4 text-gray-400" />
+                          <Input
+                            placeholder={t('resetPassword.enterRecoveryCode')}
+                            className="pl-10 font-mono"
+                            autoComplete="off"
+                            spellCheck={false}
+                            {...field}
+                          />
+                        </div>
+                      </FormControl>
+                      <FormMessage />
+                    </FormItem>
+                  )}
+                />
+              )}
 
               <FormField
                 control={form.control}

web/src/i18n/locales/en-US.ts

@@ -90,6 +90,13 @@ const enUS = {
     passkeyLoginSuccess: 'Passkey verified successfully, signing in...',
     passkeyLoginFailed: 'Failed to sign in with Passkey',
     passkeyNotSupported: 'Passkey is not supported on this browser or device',
+    loginTotpTitle: 'Two-Factor Verification',
+    loginTotpDesc:
+      'Enter the 6-digit code from your authenticator app, or a recovery code',
+    loginTotpPlaceholder: 'Authenticator or recovery code',
+    loginTotpVerify: 'Verify',
+    loginTotpVerifying: 'Verifying...',
+    loginTotpInvalid: 'Invalid code, please try again',
     spaceLoginTitle: 'Login with LangBot Account',
     spaceLoginDescription:
       'Scan the QR code or visit the link below to authorize',
@@ -1279,6 +1286,8 @@ const enUS = {
     registerWithPassword: 'Register with email and password',
     initSuccess: 'Initialization successful, please login',
     initFailed: 'Initialization failed: ',
+    totpHint:
+      'Recommended: enable two-factor authentication (TOTP) after signing in to secure your account.',
   },
   resetPassword: {
     title: 'Reset Password 🔐',
@@ -1298,6 +1307,22 @@ const enUS = {
     resetFailed:
       'Password reset failed, please check your email and recovery key',
     backToLogin: 'Back to Login',
+    totpMethod: 'TOTP Authenticator',
+    recoveryCodeMethod: 'Recovery Code',
+    verifyMethod: 'Verification Method',
+    totpMethodsUnavailable:
+      'TOTP is not enabled for this account; only the recovery key can be used.',
+    totpCode: 'Authenticator Code',
+    enterTotpCode: 'Enter the 6-digit code from your authenticator app',
+    recoveryCode: 'Recovery Code',
+    enterRecoveryCode: 'Enter one of your recovery codes',
+    totpCodeRequired: 'Authenticator code cannot be empty',
+    recoveryCodeRequired: 'Recovery code cannot be empty',
+    totpNotEnabled:
+      'TOTP is not enabled for this account, use the recovery key instead',
+    invalidTotpCode: 'Invalid verification code, please try again',
+    totpMethodDescription:
+      'Verify with a TOTP authenticator app or one of your recovery codes',
   },
   embedding: {
     description: 'Manage Embedding models for text vectorization',
@@ -1357,6 +1382,38 @@ const enUS = {
     passkeyAddedSuccess: 'Passkey added successfully',
     passkeyDeleteSuccess: 'Passkey deleted',
     passkeyRenameSuccess: 'Passkey renamed successfully',
+    totpSectionTitle: 'Two-Factor Authentication (TOTP)',
+    totpSectionDesc:
+      'Scan a QR code to add a TOTP authenticator for extra login security',
+    totpEnabled: 'Enabled',
+    totpDisabled: 'Disabled',
+    enableTotp: 'Enable TOTP',
+    disableTotp: 'Disable TOTP',
+    totpEnabledSuccess: 'Two-factor authentication enabled',
+    totpDisabledSuccess: 'Two-factor authentication disabled',
+    totpEnrollTitle: 'Add TOTP Authenticator',
+    totpEnrollDesc:
+      'Scan the QR code with your authenticator app, then enter the 6-digit code to confirm',
+    totpScanHint: 'Scan this QR code with your authenticator app',
+    totpManualSecret: 'Or enter this key manually',
+    totpCodeLabel: 'Authenticator Code',
+    totpCodePlaceholder: '6-digit code',
+    totpVerify: 'Verify and Enable',
+    totpVerifying: 'Verifying...',
+    totpRecoveryCodesTitle: 'Recovery Codes',
+    totpRecoveryCodesDesc:
+      'Store these codes somewhere safe. Each code can be used once if you lose access to your authenticator.',
+    totpRecoveryCodesRemaining: '{{count}} recovery codes remaining',
+    totpRegenerateRecoveryCodes: 'Regenerate Recovery Codes',
+    totpRecoveryCodesRegenerated: 'Recovery codes regenerated',
+    totpDisableTitle: 'Disable Two-Factor Authentication',
+    totpDisableDesc:
+      'Enter a valid authenticator code to disable two-factor authentication',
+    totpConfirmDisable: 'Disable',
+    totpInvalidCode: 'Invalid code, please try again',
+    totpLoadFailed: 'Failed to load two-factor authentication status',
+    totpCopySecret: 'Copy key',
+    totpCopied: 'Copied to clipboard',
     bindSpaceFailed: 'Failed to bind LangBot Account',
     bindSpaceInvalidState:
       'Invalid bind request. Please try again from account settings.',

web/src/i18n/locales/es-ES.ts

@@ -1330,6 +1330,8 @@ const esES = {
     newPasswordRequired: 'La nueva contraseña no puede estar vacía',
     resetPassword: 'Restablecer contraseña',
     resetting: 'Restableciendo...',
+    totpMethodsUnavailable:
+      'TOTP no está habilitado para esta cuenta; solo se puede usar la clave de recuperación.',
     resetSuccess:
       'Contraseña restablecida correctamente, por favor inicia sesión',
     resetFailed:

web/src/i18n/locales/ja-JP.ts

@@ -92,6 +92,13 @@ const jaJP = {
     passkeyLoginFailed: 'パスキーでのログインに失敗しました',
     passkeyNotSupported:
       'お使いのブラウザまたはデバイスはパスキーをサポートしていません',
+    loginTotpTitle: '二要素認証',
+    loginTotpDesc:
+      '認証アプリの6桁のコード、またはリカバリーコードを入力してください',
+    loginTotpPlaceholder: '認証コードまたはリカバリーコード',
+    loginTotpVerify: '確認',
+    loginTotpVerifying: '確認中...',
+    loginTotpInvalid: 'コードが無効です。もう一度お試しください',
     spaceLoginTitle: 'LangBot アカウントでログイン',
     spaceLoginDescription:
       'QRコードをスキャンするか、下のリンクにアクセスして認証してください',
@@ -1286,6 +1293,8 @@ const jaJP = {
     registerWithPassword: 'メールアドレスとパスワードで登録',
     initSuccess: '初期化に成功しました。ログインしてください',
     initFailed: '初期化に失敗しました：',
+    totpHint:
+      '推奨：ログイン後、アカウント設定で二要素認証（TOTP）を有効にしてアカウントを保護してください。',
   },
   resetPassword: {
     title: 'パスワードをリセット 🔐',
@@ -1305,6 +1314,21 @@ const jaJP = {
     resetFailed:
       'パスワードのリセットに失敗しました。メールアドレスと復旧キーを確認してください',
     backToLogin: 'ログインに戻る',
+    totpMethod: 'TOTP 認証アプリ',
+    recoveryCodeMethod: 'リカバリーコード',
+    verifyMethod: '確認方法',
+    totpMethodsUnavailable:
+      'このアカウントでは TOTP が有効になっていません。リカバリーキーのみ使用できます。',
+    totpCode: '認証コード',
+    enterTotpCode: '認証アプリに表示される6桁のコードを入力',
+    recoveryCode: 'リカバリーコード',
+    enterRecoveryCode: 'リカバリーコードのいずれかを入力',
+    totpCodeRequired: '認証コードは必須です',
+    recoveryCodeRequired: 'リカバリーコードは必須です',
+    totpNotEnabled:
+      'このアカウントでは TOTP が有効になっていません。復旧キーを使用してください',
+    invalidTotpCode: '認証コードが無効です。もう一度お試しください',
+    totpMethodDescription: 'TOTP 認証アプリまたはリカバリーコードで確認します',
   },
   embedding: {
     description: 'テキストのベクトル化に使用する埋め込みモデルを管理します',
@@ -1364,6 +1388,37 @@ const jaJP = {
     passkeyAddedSuccess: 'パスキーが正常に追加されました',
     passkeyDeleteSuccess: 'パスキーを削除しました',
     passkeyRenameSuccess: 'パスキー名を変更しました',
+    totpSectionTitle: '二要素認証 (TOTP)',
+    totpSectionDesc:
+      'QR コードをスキャンして TOTP 認証アプリを追加し、ログインの安全性を高めます',
+    totpEnabled: '有効',
+    totpDisabled: '無効',
+    enableTotp: 'TOTP を有効化',
+    disableTotp: 'TOTP を無効化',
+    totpEnabledSuccess: '二要素認証を有効にしました',
+    totpDisabledSuccess: '二要素認証を無効にしました',
+    totpEnrollTitle: 'TOTP 認証アプリを追加',
+    totpEnrollDesc:
+      '認証アプリで QR コードをスキャンし、6桁のコードを入力して確認します',
+    totpScanHint: '認証アプリでこの QR コードをスキャンしてください',
+    totpManualSecret: 'またはこのキーを手動で入力',
+    totpCodeLabel: '認証コード',
+    totpCodePlaceholder: '6桁のコード',
+    totpVerify: '確認して有効化',
+    totpVerifying: '確認中...',
+    totpRecoveryCodesTitle: 'リカバリーコード',
+    totpRecoveryCodesDesc:
+      'これらのコードは安全な場所に保管してください。認証アプリが使えない場合、各コードは一度だけ使用できます。',
+    totpRecoveryCodesRemaining: '残り {{count}} 個のリカバリーコード',
+    totpRegenerateRecoveryCodes: 'リカバリーコードを再生成',
+    totpRecoveryCodesRegenerated: 'リカバリーコードを再生成しました',
+    totpDisableTitle: '二要素認証を無効化',
+    totpDisableDesc: '有効な認証コードを入力して二要素認証を無効化します',
+    totpConfirmDisable: '無効化',
+    totpInvalidCode: 'コードが無効です。もう一度お試しください',
+    totpLoadFailed: '二要素認証の状態の読み込みに失敗しました',
+    totpCopySecret: 'キーをコピー',
+    totpCopied: 'クリップボードにコピーしました',
     bindSpaceFailed: 'LangBot アカウントの連携に失敗しました',
     bindSpaceInvalidState:
       '無効な連携リクエストです。アカウント設定から再度お試しください。',

web/src/i18n/locales/ru-RU.ts

@@ -1306,6 +1306,8 @@ const ruRU = {
     newPasswordRequired: 'Новый пароль не может быть пустым',
     resetPassword: 'Сбросить пароль',
     resetting: 'Сброс...',
+    totpMethodsUnavailable:
+      'TOTP не включён для этой учётной записи; доступен только ключ восстановления.',
     resetSuccess: 'Пароль успешно сброшен, пожалуйста, войдите',
     resetFailed: 'Ошибка сброса пароля, проверьте email и ключ восстановления',
     backToLogin: 'Вернуться к входу',

web/src/i18n/locales/th-TH.ts

@@ -1277,6 +1277,8 @@ const thTH = {
     newPasswordRequired: 'รหัสผ่านใหม่ต้องไม่ว่างเปล่า',
     resetPassword: 'รีเซ็ตรหัสผ่าน',
     resetting: 'กำลังรีเซ็ต...',
+    totpMethodsUnavailable:
+      'บัญชีนี้ยังไม่ได้เปิดใช้ TOTP ใช้ได้เฉพาะคีย์กู้คืนเท่านั้น',
     resetSuccess: 'รีเซ็ตรหัสผ่านสำเร็จ กรุณาเข้าสู่ระบบ',
     resetFailed: 'รีเซ็ตรหัสผ่านล้มเหลว กรุณาตรวจสอบอีเมลและคีย์กู้คืน',
     backToLogin: 'กลับไปหน้าเข้าสู่ระบบ',

web/src/i18n/locales/vi-VN.ts

@@ -1298,6 +1298,8 @@ const viVN = {
     newPasswordRequired: 'Mật khẩu mới không được để trống',
     resetPassword: 'Đặt lại mật khẩu',
     resetting: 'Đang đặt lại...',
+    totpMethodsUnavailable:
+      'TOTP chưa được bật cho tài khoản này; chỉ có thể dùng khóa khôi phục.',
     resetSuccess: 'Đặt lại mật khẩu thành công, vui lòng đăng nhập',
     resetFailed:
       'Đặt lại mật khẩu thất bại, vui lòng kiểm tra email và khóa khôi phục',

web/src/i18n/locales/zh-Hans.ts

@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@ const zhHans = {
     passkeyLoginSuccess: 'Passkey 验证成功，正在登录...',
     passkeyLoginFailed: 'Passkey 登录失败',
     passkeyNotSupported: '当前浏览器或设备不支持 Passkey',
+    loginTotpTitle: '两步验证',
+    loginTotpDesc: '请输入验证器应用中的 6 位验证码，或使用恢复码',
+    loginTotpPlaceholder: '验证码或恢复码',
+    loginTotpVerify: '验证',
+    loginTotpVerifying: '验证中...',
+    loginTotpInvalid: '验证码无效，请重试',
     spaceLoginTitle: '通过 LangBot 账号登录',
     spaceLoginDescription: '扫描二维码或访问下方链接进行授权',
     spaceLoginUserCode: '您的验证码',
@@ -1219,6 +1225,8 @@ const zhHans = {
     registerWithPassword: '通过邮箱密码组合注册',
     initSuccess: '初始化成功 请登录',
     initFailed: '初始化失败：',
+    totpHint:
+      '推荐：登录后在账户设置中开启两步验证（TOTP）以保护您的账户安全。',
   },
   resetPassword: {
     title: '重置密码 🔐',
@@ -1236,6 +1244,19 @@ const zhHans = {
     resetSuccess: '密码重置成功，请登录',
     resetFailed: '密码重置失败，请检查邮箱和恢复密钥是否正确',
     backToLogin: '返回登录',
+    totpMethod: 'TOTP 验证器',
+    recoveryCodeMethod: '恢复码',
+    verifyMethod: '验证方式',
+    totpCode: '验证器验证码',
+    enterTotpCode: '输入验证器应用中的 6 位验证码',
+    recoveryCode: '恢复码',
+    enterRecoveryCode: '输入您的其中一个恢复码',
+    totpCodeRequired: '验证码不能为空',
+    recoveryCodeRequired: '恢复码不能为空',
+    totpNotEnabled: '该账户未开启 TOTP，请改用恢复密钥',
+    invalidTotpCode: '验证码无效，请重试',
+    totpMethodDescription: '使用 TOTP 验证器应用或恢复码进行验证',
+    totpMethodsUnavailable: '该账户未开启 TOTP 验证，仅可使用恢复密钥重置密码',
   },
   embedding: {
     description: '管理嵌入模型，用于向量化文本',
@@ -1291,6 +1312,35 @@ const zhHans = {
     passkeyAddedSuccess: '通行密钥添加成功',
     passkeyDeleteSuccess: '通行密钥已删除',
     passkeyRenameSuccess: '通行密钥重命名成功',
+    totpSectionTitle: '两步验证 (TOTP)',
+    totpSectionDesc: '扫描二维码添加 TOTP 验证器，提升登录安全性',
+    totpEnabled: '已开启',
+    totpDisabled: '未开启',
+    enableTotp: '开启 TOTP',
+    disableTotp: '关闭 TOTP',
+    totpEnabledSuccess: '两步验证已开启',
+    totpDisabledSuccess: '两步验证已关闭',
+    totpEnrollTitle: '添加 TOTP 验证器',
+    totpEnrollDesc: '使用验证器应用扫描二维码，然后输入 6 位验证码完成确认',
+    totpScanHint: '使用验证器应用扫描此二维码',
+    totpManualSecret: '或手动输入此密钥',
+    totpCodeLabel: '验证码',
+    totpCodePlaceholder: '6 位验证码',
+    totpVerify: '验证并开启',
+    totpVerifying: '验证中...',
+    totpRecoveryCodesTitle: '恢复码',
+    totpRecoveryCodesDesc:
+      '请妥善保存这些恢复码。当您无法使用验证器时，每个恢复码可使用一次。',
+    totpRecoveryCodesRemaining: '剩余 {{count}} 个恢复码',
+    totpRegenerateRecoveryCodes: '重新生成恢复码',
+    totpRecoveryCodesRegenerated: '恢复码已重新生成',
+    totpDisableTitle: '关闭两步验证',
+    totpDisableDesc: '输入有效的验证器验证码以关闭两步验证',
+    totpConfirmDisable: '关闭',
+    totpInvalidCode: '验证码无效，请重试',
+    totpLoadFailed: '加载两步验证状态失败',
+    totpCopySecret: '复制密钥',
+    totpCopied: '已复制到剪贴板',
     bindSpaceFailed: '绑定 LangBot 账号失败',
     bindSpaceInvalidState: '无效的绑定请求，请从账户设置重新发起',
     setPasswordHint: '设置密码后可使用邮箱密码登录',

web/src/i18n/locales/zh-Hant.ts

@@ -1234,6 +1234,7 @@ const zhHant = {
     newPasswordRequired: '新密碼不能為空',
     resetPassword: '重設密碼',
     resetting: '重設中...',
+    totpMethodsUnavailable: '此帳戶未開啟 TOTP 驗證，僅可使用恢復金鑰重設密碼',
     resetSuccess: '密碼重設成功，請登入',
     resetFailed: '密碼重設失敗，請檢查電子郵件和恢復金鑰是否正確',
     backToLogin: '返回登入',